
THE
PERSONALIST
*An International Review
of Philosophy, Religion, and Literature*

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Our Contributors' Page

A Turn in the Road of History comes through the ideas of great thinkers. Heraclitus, with his doctrine of change and its implications for the status of man, led the Greeks to a new vision of democracy, rendering obsolete the ancient staticism. That modern science is doing something comparable in the doctrine of relativity is the editorial theme.

Laurence J. Rosán, Assistant Professor of Religion at Alabama College, and author of a work on *The Philosophy of Proclus*, continues the theme of historical influences by showing three stages of history, from the social, through the free, to the idealistic. He points out how the latter is delayed because it demands changes within the minds of men, calling attention to new aspects of a *Philosophy of History*.

Alcott and the Concord School of Philosophy continues to draw the attention of philosophers and general readers alike. No one is better prepared on this subject than Professor Kurt F. Leidecker, author of *Yankee Teacher*, the life of W. T. Harris, Alcott's inspirer. Dr. Leidecker is just returning from a year of study in India on a Fulbright fellowship.

Professor Paul R. Helsel, of the University of Southern California, traces, in *The Problem of Immortality*, the beginnings of the thought in Hellenic philosophy, then in Jewish, and its final arrival in Christian doctrine as the Resurrection of the body. Professor Helsel is one of those rare individuals of our day—a finished scholar in Greek.

"*We Must Love One Another or Die*" is the trenchant way in which Professor J. Glenn Gray, Colorado College, states the crisis of today and indicates his insight into man's universal dimension. The death of the spirit he holds to be the inevitable consequence of not loving.

Does the meekness and forgiveness required of the individual in his dealings with his neighbors hold equally in international relations, is the theme potently discussed by Dr. Henry Charles Suter of Daytona Beach, Florida, under the title *National and Individual Conduct*.

What Cervantes was to the Spanish, and Jacobson to the Danes, that was Kivi to the literature of the Finns. In the article *The Father of Finnish Prose*, Mildred Raasina McGilvra, of Finnish descent and bilingual, is especially fitted to interpret a literary light little known in America.

The poem *Aum* strikes a universal religious note. Mr. Wehner, the author, has been close to the life of the American Indian and is the son of the noted sculptor, Carl Wehner.

John Nixon, Jr., of Seven Islands, Virginia, is a newcomer to our pages in the verse *Motoring*.

Contributions to *The Personalist* do not necessarily express the sentiments of the Editors. In the interest of freedom of discussion views dissident from those of personalism are welcomed if strongly written.

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
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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

RETURN OF FAITH

The Sea of Faith

*Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.*

But now I only hear

*Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath*

*Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.*

—MATTHEW ARNOLD: *Dover Beach*.

The long, despairing roar

Of the spent tide of faith across the naked shingles
Of the world; men stand aghast in horror at a deep
so vast:

A world disclosed in which there is no God.

The darkling plain

Beset by ignorant armies, in the night of unbelief;
you say:

"There is no love, nor light, nor certitude, nor peace, nor help
for pain,"

Would mean: There is no God!

These naked stones cry out the certainty of the returning tide,
When the great deeps themselves are broken up.

On that recurring flood,

Man shall be borne upon the burden of his dark despair

To heights he had not dared to dream. Let us be true

To one another,

For therein lies our peace.

A Voice is sounding through the night: "'Tis I, be not afraid!"

Hushing the tempest into rest; the proud waves stayed

Shall bring us to the port desired,

And a great calm pervade.

Say not: "There is no God!"

For God is in the storm. His Spirit broods above the void

To bring a world, new-born.

R. T. F.

A Turn in the Road of History

BY

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

THERE have been many turns in the road of history but the world now stands at the most significant one.

The early morning of human freedom was lighted by the obscure figure of Heraclitus who perceived the regressive spirit of the static thinking of his time that had ridden the human mind as futilely as the plunging horses of a merry-go-round with much speed and little progress. Primitive as his ideas have seemed to some, and expressed for us only in fragments quoted by others, the beginning of a revolution in human culture was inaugurated by his affirmation of two novel ideas. These were a doctrine of universal change such as grounds the theory of relativity today, and the assertion of the supremacy and permanent nature of the person, which has reached a new birth in the social demands of our age. These contributions of Heraclitus have been obscured by the interpretations of such commentators as Zeller whose argument was that Heraclitus had no clear consciousness of Supreme personality since, "the question, indeed of the personality of the primitive essence in this sense had never been raised in the ancient philosophy . . . until the time of Carneades and Plotinus." This seems a gratuitous conclusion in face of the fact that the concept of personality is the first to arrive in human consciousness, and the first to be attributed to deity in the most primitive faith. Furthermore, any doctrine of relativity throws the concept of the person into the foreground since the person is the one entity in such a system that can survive the transient events of human experience.

The man who wrote: "Follow every road and you cannot reach the frontiers of the soul, so great is its logos," must have believed that he had a soul which was identical with his own observing and continuing entity. This notion was confirmed in the researches of Teichmüller.¹ Thus Heraclitus fought the cyclic theory of God and history and opened the way for the spiritual advance of Western culture. We shall endeavor to prove our point from the writings of Zeller as of testimony from a hostile witness.²

Heraclitus proposes a new problem to philosophy. Instead of the question of the substance of which things consist, prominence is given to the enquiry as to the causes from which arise generation, decay, and change, and in devoting supreme attention to this enquiry, the pre-Socratic physical philosophy changes its whole character. (II;112)

Zeller refutes his own denial of a concept of personality to Heraclitus by the following statement: "The pre-existence of the soul and its existence after death cannot, strictly speaking, be brought into connection with the ceaseless change of all things; but we shall nevertheless find that Heraclitus believed in it" (II;76) Three pages later he adds that Heraclitus held the soul to be "the infinite portion of man's nature," its participation in the Divine, which is the ultimately Real. The Logos is the efficient force, the all-ruling Wisdom of the world, and self-conscious, if we follow Teichmüller here. One other touch of this remarkable ancient could well be added here, for it was Pasteur who was to make the scientific discovery, and Lecomte du Noüy who was to set forth, definitively, dissymmetry as the concomitant of all life, early expressed by Heraclitus in the words "Out of strife comes existence," declaring that the structure of the world depends upon such opposite tensions as that of the lyre and the bow and string. His personalism was attested by the assertion that self-examination is the door to knowledge.

¹*Studien*, I: 181, as quoted by Zeller.

²*Presocratic Philosophy*, translated by S. F. Alleyne, Longmans, 1881.

This revolution in ideas was something more than empty dream though it had to tarry millenniums for fulfilment through the discoveries of modern science. The ages had to wait until the intellectual bankruptcy of monism, both spiritual and materialistic, were apparent to perceptive minds. However, one idea, that of personality, was seized upon and entered into social and political doctrine through the work of the Stoics.

Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, began his career by writing a counterblast to Plato's *Republic*, the press copy of modern Utopias and totalitarianisms, which prefer and put their trust in authority and compulsion rather than in the exercise of personal freedom. Zeno's *Republic* was pictured as embracing the whole world, and one in which each of its citizens was assumed to possess the wisdom of Plato's Philosopher King. Instead of a city-state it was to be a cosmopolitan democracy. This much Zeno had taken from Heraclitus' concept of the intrinsic worth of the individual in a system of universal relations. Toynbee in his *Study of History* suggests that such a dream of a cosmopolis engaged the thought of Alexander the Great, but failed because of the contrasts that existed between the four great civilizations which he hoped to unite. The Stoic dream of universal order passed on, however, into the ideals of the Roman Empire in the doctrine of equality before the law, which brought the welcome submission of many peoples desirous of peace and order. But the Stoic dream failed because, after all, it was less than democratic in the imposition of its rule upon others, in the capacity of a "chosen people." Except for the one phase personal equality, Plato and the Oriental absolutism had overcome Heraclitus and Zeno. In spite of the growth of democracy through the long centuries, Platonism has lingered in every totalitarian institution of Western life, political, social, or ecclesiastical. Revived in German thought through the influence of Hegel, it paved the way for a new dream of a "chosen people" called to impose themselves on the rest of the world. Lingered in theology, it is still the basis of authoritarianism, Protestant or Catholic, and finds a renaissance in con-

temporary Neo-Orthodoxy. Making strange bedfellows and applied to the problem of secular knowledge, it issues in materialistic monism. Spencer's "Unknowable" becomes a source of information almost inexhaustible, whose admonitions he "dares not to carelessly let die." This intuitionism (a tautological pipe dream in forty volumes, more or less) seems a strange conclusion for such as believe that nothing exists but matter and nothing occurs but motion, but, in the absence of philosophical acumen, modern materialism has swallowed it hook, line, and sinker. Even society is invested, by analogy, with an incipient glandular secreting organ "which consists of a number of adjacent cell-containing follicles having separate mouths."³ One cannot too much wonder that our Soviet friends fall for this sort of thing, but one does wonder if the continued allegiance to Spencer's "science" on the part of certain contemporary scientists denotes plain ignorance of their own field, or the probability that they have never read Spencer. This confusion of intuitionism with mechanistic materialism, which still fools those who wish to be fooled, and the connection therewith of present-day communistic thought is commented on by Toynbee⁴ in an understanding way when he writes: "The Marx who has conjured this matter out of that spirit by blending Syriac religion with western philosophy is a mighty magician." The true totalitarian spirit goes along with this sort of thing by compelling its scholars to do lip service to Spencer, Darwin, as interpreted by Spencer, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. "Wisdom is justified of her children."

The pronouncement of Heraclitus that "substance" was the result of universal activity manifested in its higher nature through the enduring personality of the Deity, and implying the intrinsic character of human personality, changed the tenor of Greek philosophy. It brought in its train not only a new concept of the physical world but likewise a new concept of man. The first of these led eventually to the scientific investigation of nature, the latter to a new concept

³Spencer: *Principles of Sociology*, p. 481, Appleton, N.Y., 1921.

⁴*A Study of History*, p. 179, Vol. V, Oxford, 1948.

of human freedom. The rediscovery of these two principles in our day indicates another turn in the road of human history. But between these analogous circumstances of time lies the abyss of two thousand years of human experience and of scientific discovery.

First, the thrall of Platonic absolutism with its perfected, completed, Absolute God had to give way to a more human conception. The "Unmoved Mover," on the outside of human and earthly affairs had to be seen as a living God. Such was the teaching of Jesus and the Hebrew prophets. How could the Creator of a living world be thought of as having no part in that which he was creating? The picture of God set forth in the Gospels and depicted by the Man of Nazareth as participating in the life of men, was of one who could only complete Himself in His continuing creative activity. For long, very long, the neo-platonic, Oriental idea of a perfected God, mingling with a base world and baser men, persisted in spite of the plain teaching of Jesus and the Prophets. Such participation was deemed a blasphemous limitation of the Divine. This essential Deism has continued to befog the minds of theologians. What has been overlooked is the voluntary limitation which attends every creator. To do or to make anything means that he who creates limits himself to specific forms and finds therein the expression of his own nature. This sort of limitation which is the price that must be paid for creative effort is not a true limitation but rather a means to higher expression. Self-limitation for a higher purpose in view is of the very essence of a living creating Divinity, as it is also of the highest human achievement. Such a God may be presumed to suffer in man's sufferings, for the sake of his moral re-creation, which can only be voluntary, and the fall of a sparrow is not beneath the Divine notice. The inevitable outcome of the previous unchristian conception of God has been to construct an image of God as an unfeeling Despot rejoicing in punishment, and in the face of whose irascibility, authority, and favored institutions the individual was negligible. The better interpretation is found in the concept of a living God, for to live is to endure a present incompleteness in pursuit of a growing pur-

pose. Life, with its incompleteness and its hazards, is ever superior to death.

On the part of science also there had to be a supreme *aufklärung*. Science has mimicked the absolutism of philosophy and theology by building its concepts on a monistic absolutism of matter. Hobbes laid down the working dogma of the now discarded physics: "All that exists is matter and all that occurs is motion." This dictum, as over against the dogma of Absolute Spirit as the only reality, erected science into a mortal enemy of religion and even of human values in spite of all the efforts of conscientious and religious-minded scientists. Decade by decade the antipathy became sharper. At long last the ancient message was revived in the work of Henri Bergson, and Heraclitus' universal relativism saw new life in Einstein's doctrine of relativity.

The importance of this turn in our intellectual history is not sensed by the average understanding, nor will it be conceded by belatedly dogmatic minds in either science or theology. We have what might inelegantly be called a "rump" coterie of religionists trying by main strength and irrationality to make its absolutistic theology square with what has become an obsolete science. On the other hand is a "rump" coterie of scientists determined to continue hostility to religion and to defend an outgrown Hobbesian dogmatism. An example of this is to be seen in the recent announcement of certain scientists through the press that there *must* be an "ether" in spite of the material disproof of that hypothesis in experiments of unquestionable standing. The joke now lies in their attempt to prove their point, not by subjection to material experiment, but by the discovery of what they believe to be a flaw in Einstein's mathematical formula. It sometimes seems as if both parties to the age-long disputes between science and religion are averse to intellectual peace for fear that neither would have anything to disagree about, but who like spoiled children desire to hold a monopoly of attention.

The present situation has been aggravated by the dissolution of parochialism and nationalism around the world. The atomic bomb

with what it holds of future promise or threat has swept away all frontiers of a physical nature and left a world of divided opinions facing starkly the only frontier left, that of the soul. The spiritual nature of this frontier is all that separates us from cosmic suicide. The powerlessness of an unregenerate or immoral science, or of an indifferent religion, to keep back that destruction has become suddenly apparent to all thoughtful men who do not cover their eyes. Our age now calls for a religion on a sufficiently broad basis to include a universal society. Unless old orthodoxies, fitted only to parochial, or class, or racial demands, are expanded to embrace all men of good will, those orthodoxies, of whatever kind, with their bad as well as their good points, must perish. There must be peace and co-operation in maintaining a spiritual frontier. Formulas higher than orthodoxy must now be found whereon men of all races, classes, and conditions can unite in working harmony. This basis can be no less than that love of God which is the source of our ability to love our neighbor as ourselves.

On the side of science there opens before us the possibility of an Edenic world as soon as we are spiritually prepared to use it for the general good instead of the extinction of those of opposing ideas or cultures. Science poses for us a new era in the fact that its supreme discoveries lie in the regions of the unseen where the bigoted materialist cannot penetrate. The present dilemma of science is that it can go no farther without launching into metaphysics. It has already, through radio, television, electronics, and biogenetics, come upon intimations of other worlds as yet beyond our reach. It has pushed back the frontiers of knowledge until they impinge upon the frontier of the soul. What spiritual acquisition might be necessary to push forward that frontier? Already matter is viewed as possessing no greater substance than that of forces which intermingle without losing direction and pass through each other in a way to cancel all our previous definitions of matter. We deal with energies having, in the old sense, no substance but possessing a power to bear meaning to our very immaterial minds. As constructs of the human mind

we are able to deal with them and to make them our servants. This fact is the best evidence we have that they are of the same nature with our minds, and man himself becomes the most important element in a world of facts. This potent activity which presents itself through atom and cosmic ray can be seen as allied to and a part of those inner forces of personal consciousness which ground mental constructs and are alike the sources of genius, insight, and holiness. Our most unbelieving but sincere scientists have come to acknowledge that explanation of the universe, even a rational conception of it, is impossible without the further mental construct of a Supreme Creative Intelligence operative in and over all. Metaphysics has in our day become necessary to scientific assumption.

The clear outcome of relativity is that man now finds himself in a single system of relationships involving the whole world of time and sense. In one phase it bears the terrifying alternative, a possible disruption of relations which embrace the whole order through development of the atomic bomb. We have now uncovered and made possible the release of physical powers as universal as the planets, and these powers can be stayed only through the prevailing sense of moral and spiritual obligation which each of us bears toward all the others. The greatest disclosure of relativity is not that which concerns the physical world deep with desperation as it may be. The greatest disclosure it makes is the necessity for a new world of moral and spiritual integrity. However great the advances of science, all benefits that they involve are now seen to be placed in jeopardy by human skulduggery in any portion of the world. We are in community whether we wish it or not. We deceive ourselves if we think it merely an affair of weight of arms, or efficiency of weapons. The only salvation for the world lies in an advance of the spiritual frontiers. This is not so much dependent upon institutions and organizations as it is upon the rectitude of individual men, since within the power of a single individual may lie the forces of universal destruction.

Once again in history has come a turn in the road of history with an emphasis upon personality which points the way to democracy,

the inviolable sanctity of the person. But the alternative is cosmic and not parochial. We must all arrive at a new appreciation of the spiritual forces underlying all realities having to do with human conduct, and we must unite our efforts to arrive at understandings that shall embrace all partial creeds, all earnest efforts, however limited, to arrive at a sincere interpretation of God and morality and social responsibility.

We stand at the frontier of a new world if we but have the spiritual fortitude to enter in.

Aum

By GEORGE WEHNER

Nothing is lost.
The Giver is my Father.
And what I momentarily lose sight of
Remains in his keeping for me.
What he has truly given
Is mine eternally.
No song may be pilfered from the throat of a bird,
Nor a single hue stolen from a flower.
But the wind that blows over the strings of a harp
Is universal,
And may swell the sails of any passing barque.

Outlines of a Philosophy of History

BY

LAURENCE J. ROSAN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY is based upon the philosophy of human nature; in what way then does the nature of man differ from that of the animals? An animal is a state of consciousness behaving in certain definite ways according to certain natural laws generally called instincts; these natural laws are not learned, they do not come from the outside, thus they must be contained in the very structure of the animal's own consciousness, and it can do no other than obey. A human being, on the other hand, although he also possesses certain natural tendencies which may possibly become actual, is at birth ignorant of all those patterns of behavior and thought or *social* laws which are later to make him distinctly human and which he must learn from some external source but from which, by the same token, he may also be freed. This last possibility enables us to make a purely formal division of human beings into three types: the *social* individual, or one whose actions and thoughts are completely controlled by the social laws of the particular group into which he was born; the *free* individual, or one who has either not learned or else rejected these social laws so that his actions follow no consistent standard and his thoughts fall into no mold; and the *idealistic* individual, or one who creates for himself some positive ideal or ideals by which his life can be guided and his place in the universe can be clarified. It should be noticed that the second type of individual, who by himself is only negative in nature, serves as the necessary transition from the first to the third, inasmuch as a new pattern of action or thought cannot be created until one's allegiance

to the older patterns has been previously relinquished. And we may also apply the same triple division to the philosophy of history and distinguish between the social stage of history, the free stage and the idealistic stage respectively, it being understood that at each stage of history all three types of individual may be found.

In the social stage of history, which is both logically and chronologically prior to the other two, the individual is regarded as having value only insofar as he performs some function which is acceptable to the social group as a whole; if he does, he is accorded social recognition; if he does not, he must suffer the insecurity of social disapproval. It is clear that, of the three different types of individual mentioned above, only the social person is adapted to this stage of history; the free and idealistic individuals are regarded as deviations from the norm, but, not offering any threat to the general security, they are tolerated and, in some cultures, even to a certain degree honored.

Not so, however, in the transition from the social to the free stage of history, which is usually initiated by a conflict between two or more codes of social laws and which is therefore a period of extreme tension. For when confronted by two or more possible methods of behaving under certain circumstances or two or more possible attitudes to a single problem the claims of each of which to be obeyed are equal in intensity, rather than choose one over the other, an individual is more likely to reject both and, in so doing, become to this extent a free person. But he will be immediately opposed by all those to whom the social laws continue to be the essence of living; they will be jealously conservative of the older values and, particularly if there be also present within themselves some secret inclination to which they might otherwise yield should the general structure of their thought become disorganized, they will fear and mistrust anyone whose actions intimate that he has already passed beyond the bounds of obedience to the accepted code and whose example therefore tends to strengthen their own temptation. The idealistic person during this transition stage, since he also ostensibly does not conform,

is likely to be misunderstood and subjected together with the free individual to the same suspicion and condemnation.

Although the remaining stages of history have actually existed only under restricted conditions, this does not prevent us from examining their characteristics theoretically; for it seems to be clear that once the transition from the social to the free stage has been effected, the previous tension ceases to exist. The individual is now valued not as a cog in society but as an end in himself; generally he devotes himself primarily to the satisfaction of his biological nature, not, however, because this constitutes his essence, but for lack of any other positive standard of action. By this time the social person is regarded as old-fashioned and slightly ridiculous, whereas the idealistic person is still an interesting peculiarity.

Now the transition from the free to the idealistic stage of history no longer takes place in the external world of time and space but deep within the human consciousness itself. For it is not long before the free individual feels the negativity of his existence, how it has no more purpose to it than a brute's; and there arises within him a new tension, first the effort to create a positive ideal or system of ideals by which he may now give his life the purpose which it heretofore had lacked, and then a struggle to discipline his consciousness away from its former random freedom and to hammer it into conformity with his self-created standard. The social person obviously no longer takes any part in this process. But the emotions of the other two types of individual will vary from the self-deprecation of one who has just become aware of his meaninglessness, through the self-pity of one who has not yet put his newly found meaning into practice, all the way to the wild triumph of that hypothetical person who, having discovered for himself some single ideal, whatever it may be, that will dominate and integrate his entire consciousness, enters the last stage of history. And here he ceases from all his previous inner tension, now being completely controlled by the power of his own ideal, and he lives in it and has his being in it, and is conscious only of its perfect oneness.

If this theory of history be correct, why have we not long ago entered the idealistic stage? Because repeatedly in the past the fundamental error has been made of confusing a social law with an ideal; both are positive standards of action, but the first comes from without while the second is an individual creation. Yet the greatest idealists of the past have consistently sought to convert others by founding religions, establishing churches and promulgating their ideals as commandments, thus transforming them into new social laws and beginning the whole cycle of history over again. And further, these social laws which were originally conceived as ideals are especially despotic in their domination over the mind inasmuch as any new inclination toward idealism, finding sympathetic overtones in the already existent laws, will tend to interpret itself within the framework of these laws, strengthening their hold and thus indefinitely postponing their ultimate disintegration and dissolution. Since the time of the Renaissance the Western world has been passing through this kind of tediously drawn-out period of transition from the social stage of history to the free stage; for the standards and attitudes of the Hebrew-Christian tradition, being idealistic in origin, have continued in existence due to copious transfusions from new sources of inspiration which would otherwise have become independent. But blessedness cannot be legislated by decree nor salvation sought outside of the consciousness which is in need thereof; each person therefore must have the freedom to work out his own salvation and must not confuse the inner cries of his newly born ideal with the outer sighs of a dying tradition.

Amos Bronson Alcott and the Concord School of Philosophy

BY

KURT F. LEIDECKER

ANYONE breaking a lance for Amos Bronson Alcott is espousing an unpopular cause. The literature professors do not want him, the educators chide him, the philosophers disown him. He is represented as a figure in New England transcendentalism that lived long, wrote obscurely and talked excessively and, hence, has to be reckoned with but is inconvenient in any history written about the things into which he probed. He is mentioned by courtesy as the father of Louisa May Alcott, is made fun of as the utopist of Fruitlands and other ventures, described as a peddler among the Brahmins, a father who could not support his family, a thinker without system, neither fish nor fowl.

The fact counts generally for nothing that he was an honest man and idealist, a man "superior and distinguished," elevated without coldness, earnest without partisanship, friendly without flattery."¹ His dress, his manners and his conversation are subjects of many jokes. Had he been a scoundrel, had he abused his neighbors, written diatribes and spiced his conversations with irony and doubletalk, a more favorable literature might have sprung up around him. Good men and true are so colorless. We appreciate the evil with a chuckle but praise the good with faint interest. The treatment of Alcott which he received from his contemporaries and by our own generation is enough to make anyone who understands the man believe in his theory of the lapse despite himself.

¹F. B. Sanborn in *The Boston Sunday Herald*, June 17, 1888.

That Alcott was a good man even the skeptic will admit who asks could any others than good men have lived for long in Concord, Massachusetts? But was he a philosopher? To be sure, he is mentioned by courtesy in any good history of American philosophy. He is, to be sure, even less systematic than all the unsystematic philosophers in the Western Hemisphere. If we make consistent and persistent thinking upon related issues of life and thought the criterion for a philosophy, then Alcott certainly must be counted among philosophers by the same token as the ancient thinkers of the Mediterranean region from whom he drew his inspiration. Alcott was not a logician, but he lived his insights and translated them into practice, unlike Emerson who abode by conventions, less brusquely than Thoreau who defied them. His immense love of people helped preserve his social equilibrium without compromising his ideals.

In his youth, Alcott was every bit as original as Emerson, even more so. It was his fatal mistake to take the cue from the Pythagoreans and Neo-Platonists, and thus was neither sufficiently pagan like Thoreau, nor sufficiently religious to fit into New England orthodoxy. When he gave his talks at Yale in 1857, the students were warned against his iconoclasm; yet he gave voice to something in the eager youths that Yale could never supply. One of these young men accompanied him to the station when he left and asked many questions. It was William Torrey Harris, a junior at Yale, who soon afterwards left the college for the West. He never forgot the conversation and always acknowledged Alcott as his spiritual father. It was, thus, from a very early period that the lifelong friendship between the moving spirit of the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy and Alcott the guardian spirit of the Concord School of Philosophy dates.

In order to understand the Concord School of Philosophy it is necessary that we examine more closely the relationship between these two men because it is clear that just as there would not have been any St. Louis Movement in Philosophy without Harris *and*

Brokmeyer, so there would not have been any Concord School of Philosophy without Alcott *and* Harris.

In many respects it was a strange relationship that existed between Alcott and Harris, but it is puzzling and incomprehensible only on the basis of a common, but superficial interpretation of the nature of the Missouri brand of Hegelianism and that of the Massachusetts educational venture. It might be said that Harris and Alcott between whom obvious differences existed, such as the great disparity in age (Alcott was Harris' senior by 36 years), mode of expression, and the like, chose to emphasize their agreements and suppress their differences for mutual benefit. This is, however, not entirely true. Neither is Denton J. Snider's observation quite to the point that Alcott and Harris were Yankees at heart. Harris' attachment to Brokmeyer could not be explained on a nationalistic basis. To be sure, Alcott derived benefits from Harris' friendship, for the latter was instrumental in bringing Alcott to St. Louis on several occasions, in January 1859, twice in 1866, in the fall of 1870, in February 1873 and in October 1874.² In turn, Harris and his *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* were publicized by Alcott in his travels East and in the Middle West. Moreover, Alcott opened up Concord, as it were, as an asylum for Harris when he retired from the superintendency of the St. Louis Public Schools in 1880. He rented him his Orchard House which became available when the Hillside Chapel was built. He rented it to him at a reasonable rate and thus made it possible for Harris to succeed to one of the most coveted positions in the literary tradition of New England. However, such an interpretation would do violence to the character of both Alcott and Harris, although it makes interesting psychologizing reading. Neither Alcott nor Harris ever used their friends. They ever gave more than they received.

Again, the fact that there were common interests is not too adequate a way of explaining the close association between these

²Cf. Kurt F. Leidecker, *Yankee Teacher, The Life of William Torrey Harris*. With a foreword by Nicholas Murray Butler (N. Y., 1946), pp. 357-364.

men. To be sure, Alcott was an innovator of no mean order in education, and Harris was a young rebel himself when he left Yale college. Besides, he was a vegetarian, like Alcott, and believed with him in some of the parapsychological phenomena. However, the truth of the matter lies in the fact that Alcott's personality and philosophy struck a concordant note in the Yankee from Connecticut who was opposed to convention, yet was not ready to regard "a doctrine of the supremacy of the soul and the ideality of the material world"³ as anything realizable and practical until he met Alcott. It was only after the third conversation of Alcott's that he did impress him as the man who combined in himself ideal perspectives and a workable philosophy based upon them. Harris then took up a study of the books Alcott had recommended, Thoreau's *Walden*, Jamblichus' *Life of Pythagoras*, and his own *Orphic Sayings*, thirty-six in number at that time.

After Harris had moved West and immersed himself in Hegelianism he seemed to drift away from the Neo-Platonism in which Alcott got him interested. In a steadily growing appreciation of logical and rational relationships he seemed to slip into the very antithesis of Alcott's mystical moods. There are, nevertheless, deeper bonds between Alcott and Harris which have their origin in philosophical presuppositions.

Harris himself acknowledged publicly⁴ that by 1859 he had read into at least one of the "Orphic Sayings"—the one entitled "Calculus"—a "demand for a dialectical system of pure thought as the first philosophy." This saying of Alcott's reads:

We need, what Genius is unconsciously seeking, and, by some daring generalization of the universe, shall assuredly discover, a spiritual calculus, a novum organum, where by nature shall be divined in the soul, the soul in God, matter in spirit, polarity resolved into unity; and that power which pulsates in all life, animates and builds all organizations,

³F. B. Sanborn and W. T. Harris, *A. Bronson Alcott, His Life and Philosophy* (1893), vol. 2, p. 550.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 552.

shall manifest itself as one universal deific energy, present alike at the outskirts and centre of the universe, whose centre and circumference are one; omniscient, omnipotent, self-subsisting, uncontained, yet containing all things in the unbroken synthesis of its being.

Jamblichus' entire metaphysics, of which Alcott had absorbed the salient points, is a sort of dialectic. Each unfolding, beginning with the wholly indeterminate ineffable first being which is followed by the first determined principle, the Good, which in turn brings forth the intelligible world through differentiation in eternal thought forms, is less a resting place on the rung of a downward, material-bound ladder, than the result of antithetical activity which needs its resolution. Here, then, is the prototype of the Hegelian dialectic, and credit is due Harris for the early recognition of the kinship of the systems. It is a tribute to his philosophical acumen which he manifested at the age of twenty-four, and less so to the quasi-journalistic writers who are trying to unearth ulterior motives for the seemingly incongruous attachment of Harris to both Hegel and the idols of Alcott.

In the Alcott memorial on June 16, 1888, Harris made the statement that no more interesting chapter in the history of thought exists than the speculation of Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. Though the doctrine of the lapse is repugnant to the common sense of the age, he said, it is yet a tonic, and Alcott may claim an "eminent place among philosophers" because he announced, on the basis of his own insight, the doctrine of the lapse which he may have intuited as early as 1834 in reading Coleridge and, later, in Plotinus, Proclus, and Jamblichus.

Harris did not do any violence to Alcott, as writers so often maintain, when he drew him into the thought sphere of Hegel. Alcott instinctively felt the kinship, although he was never able to master any logical system and certainly, like Emerson, despaired of mastering Hegel. Hence, the passage in his journal under November 16, 1872, to the effect that he would have to submit to his unmeth-

odical thinking being called a dialectic by Harris if the latter finds a logic in it, is not, along with other utterances of a like nature to be taken in the sense that Alcott was browbeaten by the St. Louis Hegelians when he "conversed" with them under the auspices of the St. Louis Philosophical Society. The common element of a dialectic, consciously or subconsciously applied as a method, linked Hegelians and Neo-Platonists. In this connection I wish to point out that much as been made of the lively and highly critical discussions which Brokmeyer had with Alcott, as if they indicated an intellectual hostility between the two. There was always a feeling of great mutual respect and admiration. Even though Alcott on several occasions refers to shocks and strokes that he received in the discussions with the St. Louis Hegelians,⁵ it is largely due to the fact that these men were all much younger than himself, loved argument, admired keen wit and, except for Harris, did not appreciate traditional New England ways and methods. There is a possibility that the one person who has especially underlined the distance between the St. Louis Hegelians and Alcott, namely Denton J. Snider, least understood any of the persons concerned so far as their underlying philosophy was concerned. Most writers, while aware of Snider's inaccuracies, yet imitate his method. There was a constant Plotinization and Hegelization going on between all persons involved. To mention but an instance of the latter, Alcott wrote in *Concord Days*:⁶ (145)

Hegel's secret is that of pure thought akin with that of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, the ancient masters in philosophy. The One is One out of whose womb the Not One is born to perish perpetually at its birth. Whoso pronounces PERSON apprehensively, speaks the secret of all things, and holds the key to all mysteries in nature and spirit.

Thus, Platonism, Hegelianism, and Alcott's personalism all melt into harmony.

⁵In an unpublished letter of Alcott to A. E. Kroeger, April 18, 1866.

⁶*Concord Days* (Boston, 1872), p. 145.

But enough of the spiritual and philosophical link existing between Harris and Alcott. It is necessary to point this out if we are to understand the development leading up to the formation and maintenance of the Concord School of Philosophy. Had that link not existed, the School would not have come about. True, the School functioned already in 1879 when Harris was not yet ready to pull up stakes at St. Louis; true, Dr. Hiram K. Jones, the Platonist, occupied a strong position in the whole scheme and his Platonism mixed well with Neo-Platonism; true, the officers were Alcott, Dean, S. H. Emery, Jr., Director, and F. B. Sanborn, Secretary. But what made the Concord School of Philosophy the philosophical venture which it was, is the fact of Harris' connection with it. His presence and the sixty-five lectures he gave assured its philosophic character and made for that continuity of an institution which we know is necessary and which Harris once before demonstrated in the St. Louis Philosophical Movement. Concord proved ultimately to be an extension of that movement.

Harris, however, never deliberately stole the limelight. The Concord School, after all, was Alcott's vision. Alcott had made many attempts at establishing a school at Concord, probably even before he had drawn Emerson into his confidence. Emerson mentions a scheme of that sort in his letter to Margaret Fuller, August 1840. A more tangible approach to the problem was made in the short-lived "Town and Country Club" of 1849. Ideals were high, but the organizing spirit was lacking. Neither Alcott, nor Emerson, nor Thoreau, nor any of the others whose more regular employment might have permitted them to devote time to the venture, were real organizers.

In St. Louis, Harris started his phenomenal rise from instructor to superintendent. He demonstrated that a school board can be a co-operative body and need not be tyrannical. He fired everyone with the desire to take up the study of philosophy, art, and music, of Dante, Goethe, Kant and Hegel, and organized the most varied groups of people into societies. Above all, what mattered most with

Alcott was that he was a Neo-Platonist in the garb of a Hegelian. It was all due to system, philosophical system, thought system, societal system, school system. System would overcome all obstacles. Naturally, Alcott looked to Harris to make his school come true. As early as June 6, 1869, Alcott pleadingly and searchingly wrote to Harris: "Can't we find the way for concentrating the forces of thought in an Academy or College wherein young men and women may gain command of their gifts for the high uses and ends of life?"

Note the emphasis on young people. The whole career of Alcott had been devoted in his earlier years to what we might term progressive education, as compared with the practices then in vogue. Was not Harris also interested in educating the young? Emerson's letter above referred to likewise mentions "the instruction of young men." Any venture that did not include the young even for the aging Alcott was amiss the mark of free and expansive education, such as he envisaged. His famous conversations were a side-issue, potboilers, compared with this major objective which he always had in mind.

Again he wrote Harris on February 6, 1872: "I wish we had a university waiting for a Head, and pair of Hands, I should know the man to recommend." His thought was of Harris, of course. Fresh hope was derived from the fact that Franklin Benjamin Sanborn had settled in Concord permanently. He could do the detail work which a school would necessarily entail. Harris was much too busy; he could not possibly guide a school at such a distance and even his summers were not entirely his own because he was the head of an ever-growing public school system. Still, Alcott's persistent calls and beckonings were to Harris like a call from home.

A "Fortnightly Club," organized in the late seventies, with Emerson and Sanborn as members, seemed to be a further step toward the concretization of Alcott's ideals, but alas it remained a club, perhaps the nucleus of a faculty of high-minded persons, but not a school.

The popularity of Concord as a literary center came, of course,

to the aid of any plans for a school. It was, finally, around this fact that the school idea crystallized. Many people would come to Concord just to be near the homes of the great, and would spend a week or more among pleasant and historic surroundings. It was the day of the Chautauqua which, by 1878, had already four more than successful seasons of meetings behind. It was high time to come forward with a Concord Summer Symposium. With Dr. Hiram K. Jones from Jacksonville, Illinois, able and willing to participate in it regularly, the time for decisive action was overripe. Thus, the Concord Summer School actually opened its doors on July 15, 1879, to more than two hundred people who met at the Orchard House.

A dream of Alcott's was now nearly fulfilled. The School was a reality. There was the skeleton of an administration with Sanborn as secretary, there was a faculty of eleven persons, including Alcott, Harris, H. K. Jones, David A. Wasson, Mrs. Ednah D. Cheney, T. W. Higginson, Benjamin Peirce, Thomas Davidson, Sanborn, Rev. Dr. C. A. Bartol, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Of the original planners only three survived, Emerson, Alcott and Rev. F. H. Hedge, but only the first named were present at the first summer session. Hedge, on account of illness, did not appear on the faculty until the second year.

The School was Alcott's, and it was through his persuasive powers coupled with Sanborn's secretarial labors that it came to pass. Emerson was already too feeble to have taken any part in its organization. He participated only in the first and second year of its existence. There was, however, no resident scholar who would insure its perpetuation from year to year, or its development into a real winter university. It was for this and similar reasons that Alcott exerted all his efforts to lure Harris to Concord. He finally succeeded in the year 1880 when Harris retired from the St. Louis Public School superintendency. Alcott's bliss was nearly complete then, for the ideal university was now to be realized, and it was but a question of time when it would be in full swing.

On April 22, 1882, Emerson died. If Emerson had given much

thought at all to the School—he was very feeble and had lapses of memory—he must have felt that his ideal of a purely literary school had been compromised. He had the greatest admiration for Harris, to be sure, but philosophy *qua* philosophy was never his forte. He did not understand it, although he voiced the essence of philosophic thought and could comprehend it in poetic form.

The 1879 School was known as Concord Summer School. But beginning with 1880 and coincident with Harris' removal to Concord, it became The Concord Summer School of Philosophy. This was by no means pretentious. It was really a university. For, where in America could have been found in those days a faculty such as was assembled at Concord? There were topflight literary men like Emerson and Alcott; distinguished philosophers like William Torrey Harris, George Holmes Howison, George Trumbull Ladd, and John Fiske; college and university presidents like John Bascom of the University of Wisconsin, Noah Porter of Yale, and James McCosh of Princeton; scholars from India and Canada, from Paris and from Rome, in addition to native scholars; divines like Frederick H. Hedge, William H. Channing, Cyrus A. Bartol and R. A. Holland; scholar-industrialists like Howland G. Hazard; free-lancers like Denton J. Snider and Thomas Davidson; poets like Julia Ward Howe and John Albee; professors from Harvard, Princeton, Cornell, Yale, Smith and other colleges; educators like F. L. Soldan and Elizabeth P. Peabody; physicians like Fillmore Moore; psychologists like William James.

During the nine years of its regular meetings there were a total of over seventy on the faculty who delivered about 340 lectures in all. Several books were the direct results of these lectures, such as *The Genius and Character of Emerson*, *The Life and Genius of Goethe*, *The Concord Lectures at the Concord Summer School of Philosophy in 1882*, and John Fiske's *The Idea of God* and *The Destiny of Man*.

The effort behind this School at Concord was due to two men, F. B. Sanborn, the one-time secretary of the American Social Sci-

ence Association, and William Torrey Harris. Alcott, from year to year, exhibited more and more the "shadowed smile of suffering." He never recovered from the apoplectic stroke he experienced on October 24, 1882. The customary salutatory and valedictory were not forthcoming from him in 1883. Mutely he sat through the sessions of his Concord School of Philosophy in 1883, 1884, and 1885, hearing passages read to the audience from his diaries of which he had an even fifty. Then, one day in May, 1888, an announcement of the School reached the desk of its friends without Alcott's name in the accustomed place as Dean. Alcott had died, and there was to be a short memorial meeting on June 16th. Harris' name appeared in the place where Alcott's had been carried as Dean from 1879 to 1887, but he did not assume the title although he had been the Dean *de facto* all along.

When Emerson passed out of the picture entirely he had taken with him whatever literary and poetic interests were dominant. When Alcott became feeble, the mystical trend in the lectures became thoroughly attenuated; but out of piety and respect for him even Harris and Tom Davidson adopted his form of presentation and announced "conversations." When Alcott was present only by proxy in the shape of his bust that stood on the shelf at the Hillside Chapel, there was emerging an even greater emphasis on philosophy as a special discipline. Proportionately more philosophers by profession came to attend the Summer School, but attendance did not fall off with increased diversification of topics and increased technicality. In 1866 only Dante and Plato came up for discussion, and twelve of the twenty-two lectures in 1887 were devoted to Aristotle with detailed outline, bibliography, and encomia. Even papers on ontology were projected, but by 1888 the School was dead. On March 4th Alcott had taken his dream with him, the dream of a school, not for adult education, but a school for the young in which teaching was to be by the conversational method.

The American dream of Neo-Platonism and gnosticism had like-

¹*The (Boston) Sunday Herald*, June 17, 1888.

wise come to an end, not to be revived to this day. The old guard assembled at Concord on June 16th to commemorate the great conversationalist. Harris made the statement that Alcott "claims an eminent place among philosophers on the ground that he revives and announces" the theory of lapses by which the first emanation from the Pure One, which is not yet regarded as fallen, perceives, by contemplating its source, dualism and hence departs from its original perfection and generates a third, less perfect than itself and so forth in ever-descending passes down to matter and into evil.

The dreamy town of Concord once more withdrew into its shell. Its school was a noble endeavor on the part of Alcott to void the lapse and lead men back to light and to the One. As his 39th "Orphic Saying" expresses it: "Man is a rudiment and embryo of God: eternity shall develop in him the divine image." But while such a view may be *sub specie aeternitatis*, the busy world clutched the doctrine of evolution, physiological psychology, progress instead of negation of lapse, and workability as the test of truth.

Someone during the 1881 session of the Concord Summer School of Philosophy called it the "Conquered School of Philosophy," for Harris jotted down the phrase on his copy of the program. There was, perhaps, some truth in that bantering remark. It had obviously been made because Harris had promoted the Hegelian point of view and the general and professional interest in his presentation, as attested by the number of people attending and the detailed reports in the Boston papers indicated the trend. He was, without a doubt, the strongest member of the faculty. Yet, he protested against such an implication and probably made some humorous remark on the implication.

Some still infer from the absence of Dr. Hiram K. Jones after a few summers that there were quarrels, that the Platonists resented this trend toward Hegelianism, and that Alcott himself became alarmed and distressed over the course of events. To be sure, Alcott had much love for his Platonist friend, but he loved Harris equally well. There was no incompatibility between Alcott, Harris, and Jones. Idealists

all, they inevitably had the highest regard for Plato. Harris himself lectured on Plato extensively when the visitors to the Concord School no longer had the benefit of Jones's comments. The approach he used was more scientific or philosophical, but therein lay the whole difference. The Concord School had taken a scholarly turn which was inevitable with Harris as the acknowledged leader, while Jones's limitations in this respect were noticeable the more those enrolled in the School represented well-known institutions of academic standing. Jones always remained not only mystic but antiscientific, identifying the progress of science with the triumph of materialism. There were no serious clashes between these three, such as McCosh, William James, or even Tom Davidson would provoke on occasion. Harris had called Jacksonville, Illinois, "a sort of university city for Philosophy in this country,"⁸ he visited with his friends in Jacksonville, he lectured before them, and his contributions to the *Journal of the American Akadémé* were goodly in number. In fact, he was present at the founding of the American Akadémé at Jacksonville on July 2, 1883.

Harris' brother, David H., and Professor Lewis J. Block had introduced a "good stiff breeze of Hegelianism" into the Jacksonville circle, as they themselves had admitted; but it was not felt out of order or not in keeping with their own aims. The fact was that Plato had been overbelabored and leadership became weaker and weaker. The editor of the *Journal of the American Akadémé*, when it was transferred from New Jersey to Jacksonville in 1890, deliberately adopted "speculative thought" in its policy. As was the case with the St. Louis movement in philosophy, all those that met at Concord, with very few exceptions, were animated by common interests and the spirit of tolerance within limits. There only was a ban on materialism and atheism. It is a certain critical cynicism which requires the interpretation of differences in point of view as necessarily an incompatibility. Speaking merely historically, if Jones had been able to dominate the Concord Summer School, as he did in conjunction

⁸In a letter reprinted in *Journal of the American Akadémé*, (October, 1890) vol. 5, p. 18.

with Harris in 1879, it would not have played the great rôle in the development of philosophic interest in the United States which it did as the Concord Summer School of *Philosophy*. Alcott was, of course, powerless to throw his weight in either direction since common ties connected him with Harris, as has been shown, and with Jones as well whose mystical and occult tendencies were more accessible to his immediate understanding. That the Concord School of Philosophy "could hardly have been established" without the Jacksonville contingent, as Henry A. Pochmann maintains,⁹ does not correspond to the facts at all which reveal what great part the Alcott-Harris relationship played in projecting this school. Moreover, such a view fails to take into account the tremendous influence which the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* was exerting at the time, not to speak of the person of Harris himself who was known all over the Eastern seaboard in educational and philosophical circles. He had a larger following by far than did the Hiram K. Jones group.

A variety of factors played into the fortunes of the Concord Summer School of Philosophy. It ceased immediately upon the death of Alcott. Its cessation, however, proved more eloquently than anything else that Harris was the main figure in it. He could have carried it for several years longer, just as he had carried it already for a number of years, with Alcott completely passive. In fact, Miss Edith Davidson Harris, the daughter of W. T. Harris, believes that, had Alcott lived, both her father and Sanborn would have made an effort to provide programs and continue the sessions out of respect for Alcott.¹⁰ Harris was still free and there was no talk as yet about his being offered the U.S. Commissionership of Education.

Also in view of the larger background of cultural history in the United States, the Concord Summer School of Philosophy had to come to a close. Hegelianism had run its course, the ideas of New England transcendentalism no longer retained their potency for the

⁹Henry A. Pochman, *New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism* (1948), p. 70.

¹⁰Miss Edith Davidson Harris, in a letter to me dated January 29, 1951.

coming generation. The "utter repudiation of materialism" to which the School was committed, no longer represented a powerful slogan in the face of the rising recognition of the dignity of science. This was the School's uncompromising stand, this was its thesis which had to generate, by its own admission, the antithesis, be it on Neo-Platonic or Hegelian assumptions.

The person of Alcott bears about the same relation to the Concord Summer School of Philosophy as did Henry C. Brokmeyer to the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy. They both were inspirers, but on their own they would never have accomplished their objectives. Who made it possible in either case was one and the same man, William Torrey Harris, whose very life is associated in its periods with these two events or institutions.

Alcott, even during his lifetime got more adverse publicity than good publicity. The newspapers at the time of the first few sessions of the Summer School were not only critical but gossipy and downright mean in many cases. They changed their tone after a year or two when it was obvious that the caliber of speakers as well as the topics discussed were such that even Boston could not withhold respect from them. The contributions which the school made not only to spreading the interest in philosophy in America, but in original papers and lectures in the field of philosophy and literature, have never been sufficiently appreciated or treated. It should be rewarding to make a factual study of the Concord Summer School of Philosophy, minus the gossip and petty criticism, so the student of philosophy and culture in the United States may know what actual work was accomplished by it.

The Problem of Immortality

BY

PAUL R. HELSEL

WONDER AT PROBLEMS incites the human mind to seek solutions. Science has conditioned modern thought with the expectation of arriving at solutions to its problems so that today problems are classified as solvable or unsolvable. The notion is abroad that problems which yield a solution in accordance with scientific standards are real, while those that do not allow such a solution are unreal, vestigial of an extinct primitivism. Due to the nature of some problems, their solutions are obtainable. As Kant says, the answer issues "from the same sources from which the question proceeds. . . . That very concept which puts us in a position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it."¹ Then Kant cites a particular case to illustrate the class of problems which may be expected to yield solutions. He says, "We must be able, in every possible case, in accordance with a rule, to know what is *right* and what is *wrong*, since this concerns our obligation, and we have no obligation to that which we cannot know."²

But problems are encountered which according to scientific standards will not yield to solutions. Yet these problems are as genuine as the solvable ones and even more clamant. The problem of immortality falls into this class. According to Kant, "the hope of a *future life* has its source in that notable characteristic of our nature, never to be capable of being satisfied by what is temporal,"³ and

¹*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 476, 478.

²*Ibid.*, A 476.

³*Ibid.*, B xxxii.

"the merely speculative proof has never been able to exercise any influence upon the ordinary reason of men."⁴ This failure of proof is the reason why Kant "found it necessary to deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*."⁵ Hence one may say that with the heart man believes in immortality.

Garvie thinks that "the belief in human immortality in some form is almost universal,"⁶ and MacCulloch declares that even "among savages . . . the idea must have been latent or already expressed in some form."⁷ The article on "Eschatology," in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* deals with the belief in immortality among the peoples of both Eastern and Western hemispheres and dates back to the dawn of recorded history. The thought of resignation seems to have disturbed the native impulse of mankind; only in hope does life find peace.

Although man's impulse has inspired the hope of immortality, yet the task of expressing that impulse in ideas has been problematical. Definitions of immortality have ranged between the widest extremes: from consigning immortality on the one hand to the storehouse of fading memory, or to Nirvana, which Buddha ascribed to "those whose minds . . . go out like this lamp,"⁸ and on the other hand to the doctrine of eternal progression. This lecture will deal only with the efforts of three cultures to express their ideas of immortality: the Hebrew-Jewish, the Greek, and the Christian. Moreover, in search for the earliest beliefs in immortality, one does not encounter express statements of the doctrine but is left to draw inferences from available evidence. Often this evidence is negative. Thoughtful men who undertook to purge the practices of their people, denounced outgrown beliefs and ceremonies.

Fosdick thinks that "the earliest Hebrews of whom we have

⁴*Ibid.*, B 423.

⁵*Ibid.*, B xxx.

⁶Alfred Ernest Garvie, "Immortality," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th edition), XIV, 336.

⁷J. A. MacCulloch, "Eschatology," Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, V, 373.

⁸Buddha, *Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller, 10:2.39.

record were convinced that dead men were not altogether dead.”⁹ From the beginning of their history, the Hebrews possessed cults of magic, divination, and necromancy. The Leviticus code declared “ye shall not make any cutting in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you.”¹⁰ The first Hebrew legislation declared that “thou shalt not suffer a sorceress to live.”¹¹ Accordingly upon Saul’s accession to the throne as Israel’s first king, he “put away those that had familiar spirits, and the wizards, out of the land.”¹² But Saul soon faced hostile Philistines. After he had inquired of Jehovah, of dreams, of Urim, and finally of the prophets, and was refused help, his fear mounted to such a pitch that in desperation he felt driven to consult a medium with a talisman, a practice which earlier he had outlawed. A witch was found at Endor who under the pledge of immunity consented to “bring up Samuel,”¹³ who had died some time before. An apparition appeared which the witch described as “a god coming up out of the earth . . . [like] an old man, and . . . wrapped in a mantle.”¹⁴ Although the magic satisfied Saul for the moment, Samuel’s advice was unwelcome.

Again Hebrew cosmology with its three compartments of heaven, earth, and Sheol, designated Sheol as the abode of the dead. Sheol resembled the Hades of Homer and at first was not included within Jehovah’s sovereignty. Job says that “before Him [Jehovah] in pain writhe the Shades, whose dwellings are beneath the waters.”¹⁵ Then after a time Sheol came under Jehovah’s authority. According to Amos, Jehovah declares of those who are disobedient that “though they dig into Sheol, thence my hand shall take them,”¹⁶ and the Psalmist rejoiced that “Jehovah will redeem my soul from Sheol.”¹⁷

⁹Harry Emerson Fosdick, *A Guide to Understanding the Bible*, p. 257.

¹⁰*Leviticus* 19:28.

¹¹*Exodus* 22:18.

¹²*I Samuel* 28:3.

¹³*Ibid.*, 28:11.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 28:13, 14.

¹⁵*Job* 26:5.

¹⁶*Amos* 9:2.

¹⁷*Psalms* 49:15.

The advent of the Hebrew Messianic hope complicated the problem of immortality. At first it was thought that the coming kingdom would be composed only of the righteous Hebrews living at the time, but later when the righteous dead also were made citizens of the Messianic kingdom, the doctrine of resurrection was essential. Moreover, after the inauguration of individualism by such thinkers as Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Job, if citizens were to share in the new kingdom, individual resurrection also was necessary. Furthermore, the fact that at the beginning the Messianic kingdom was expected to be set up on this earth, justifies Fosdick's remark that "man was unimaginable to the Hebrews without a body."¹⁸ However, when the Old Testament canon closed around the fourth century B.C., scant mention was made of a future life. Charles says that "there is not a single reference to a blessed life in the Pentateuch, nor in the Prophets strictly so called. Only in two Psalms, and in three apocalyptic writings—Job, Isaiah XXVI and Daniel, is the question dealt with."¹⁹ In the intertestamental period a great transformation took place in the Messianic expectation which shifted belief in an earthly kingdom to a heavenly one. The resurrection that was believed to inaugurate the kingdom now was postponed to its end. Still many Jews clung to their belief in the bodily resurrection.

The primitive Greek belief in immortality resembled that of the early Hebrews. In much the same way that Samuel came up from Sheol, Patroklos appeared to Achilles "in all things like his living self, in stature, and fair eyes, and voice, and the raiment of his body was the same."²⁰ After Patroklos addressed Achilles, Achilles "reached forth with his hands, but clasped him not; for like a vapour the spirit was gone beneath the earth with a faint shriek."²¹ Throughout Greek history the doctrine of Hades was

¹⁸Fosdick, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

¹⁹R. H. Charles, *Religious Development Between the Old and the New Testaments*, pp. 115-16.

²⁰Homer, *Iliad*, XXIII, 66-67.

²¹*Ibid.*, XXIII, 100-1.

perpetuated in Homeric literature and religion. Plato calls Homer "the wisest of our poets,"²² "the best and most divine,"²³ and "the great . . . teacher."²⁴ Also Hadas states that "throughout their history the Greeks were as closely familiar with . . . [the Homeric] text as Puritans with the text of the Bible."²⁵

Moreover, Homer fixed a gulf between the gods and man which in time thought must span. The idea that finally connected gods and man was alien to Greek thought. Entering by way of Orphic channels, Jaeger calls the idea "un-Homeric,"²⁶ and Urwick says that it was "as un-Greek as anything could possibly be."²⁷ Pindar was the first to express the belief that the soul was divine and immortal in duration. He said, "While the body of all men is subject to overmastering death, an image of life remains alive, for it alone cometh from the gods."²⁸ A generation after Pindar, Socrates confessed that "I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead,"²⁹ and just before his death Socrates answered the question of Crito "but how shall we bury you?" by saying, "Just as you please, if you can only catch me."³⁰

The thought of Plato particularly exerted a formulating influence upon the Christian view of immortality. Although today Christians talk of Jesus as a world person, Christianity still contains him within the Hebrew-Jewish tradition. This limitation is sectarian and deprives Jesus of the Hellenic contribution to his views. Streeter says that in the Fourth Gospel "Plato and Isaiah meet,"³¹ and Inge declares that "Christian dogma . . . has little connection"³² with

²²Plato, *Laws*, 797A.

²³Plato, *Ion*, 530B.

²⁴Plato, *The Republic*, 595B.

²⁵Moses Hadas, *A History of Greek Literature*, p. 23.

²⁶Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, p. 83.

²⁷Edward J. Urwick, *The Message of Plato*, p. 13.

²⁸Pindar, *Fragment 131* (Wm. Heinemann edition, translated by Sir John Sandays).

²⁹Plato, *Phaedo*, 63C.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 114C (Cary translation).

³¹B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, p. 367.

³²W. R. Inge, "Religion," Livingstone's *The Legacy of Greece*, p. 28.

Palestine and that although "outwardly, the continuity with Judaism seems to be unbroken, that with paganism to be broken, in reality the opposite is the fact."³³ Then Inge adds that "the Church was half Greek from the first . . . the Greek eschatology . . . prevailed over the Jewish . . . [and was] pure Platonism and quite alien to Jewish thought."³⁴ Fosdick makes the eschatological distinction clear where he says that "the Greeks taught the immortality of the soul; the Jews taught the resurrection of the body"³⁵ and that "this contrast in the New Testament between Jewish and Hellenistic ways of thinking about the future life, has remained ever since an unresolved dilemma in Christianity."³⁶ Let us then inquire how Plato conceived of the immortality of the soul.

According to Plato, God or "the good may be said to be . . . the author . . . of . . . being."³⁷ Also Plato said, ". . . that which imparts the power of knowing to the knower is . . . the . . . good."³⁸ The knower, of course, possessed a body. In Plato's opinion the body was nonbeing and belonged to "the Receptacle,"³⁹ which was "the nurse of generation,"⁴⁰ "space . . . and provides a home for all created things."⁴¹ Therefore, according to Plato human individuals were composed of two parts: reason which is being and body which is nonbeing. Moreover, Plato said that being "is that which always is and has no becoming; and . . . [that nonbeing] is that which is always becoming and never is."⁴² Furthermore, Plato held that the Creator "fashioned reason within soul and soul within body,"⁴³ and Davis says that "Plato seems . . . to regard the soul as an intermediate

³³*Ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

³⁵Fosdick, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 290.

³⁷Plato, *The Republic*, 500B.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 508E.

³⁹Plato, *Timaeus*, 49A.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 49D.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 52B.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 27E.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 30B, Cornford translation.

agent and uniting bond between perishable bodies and eternal and indestructible intellect.”⁴⁴

Although Plato thought that at birth the soul “is literally buried in an outlandish slough,”⁴⁵ that “the body is the grave of the soul . . . an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated,”⁴⁶ “wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance,”⁴⁷ yet at the same time he believed that “nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve.”⁴⁸ It is on this account that Plato claimed that the potential of “the soul is man,”⁴⁹ that this potential is able to “raise the eye of the soul to the universal light that enlightens all things, and behold the absolute good.”⁵⁰ Also Aristotle states that “reason alone enters from the outside and alone is divine,”⁵¹ and “if, then, Reason is divine. . . . We ought not to listen to those who exhort man to keep to man’s thoughts, or a mortal to the thoughts of mortality, but, as far as may be, to achieve immortality and do what a man may to live according to the highest thing that is in him; for little though it be in bulk, in power and worth it is far above all the rest. This would seem, too, to be each man himself.”⁵² Therefore, in the light of the Greek belief in the divine and immortal nature of the soul, Paul’s question “with what body do they come?”⁵³ was foreign to Greek thought. The Greeks had no conception of resurrection. Plato’s thought was representative that the body was nonbeing and perishable. On the other hand, the Greeks believed that the soul while in the body was immortal and upon being released, returned to its eternal home.

The Fourth Gospel interprets the Jewish hope of resurrection

⁴⁴Henry Davis, “Timaeus,” *The Works of Plato*, II, 334, note.

⁴⁵Plato, *The Republic*, 533D.

⁴⁶Plato, *Cratylus*, 400C.

⁴⁷Plato, *Phaedo*, 82E.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 80A.

⁴⁹Plato, *Alcibiades*, I 130C.

⁵⁰Plato, *The Republic*, 540A.

⁵¹Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, 735b27.

⁵²Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1179b30f. (Cornford translation.)

⁵³I *Corinthians* 15:35.

into the present experience of eternal life which as Fosdick says, "far from being a post-mortem goal, is a present, interior possession of the soul."⁵⁴ The Gospel of John declares: "He that believeth on me hath eternal life";⁵⁵ "he that heareth my words, and believeth on him that sent me, hath eternal life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life";⁵⁶ and "this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou has sent."⁵⁷ In other words the Fourth Gospel claims that death is not something *to be* overcome, but that through faith it now *may be* overcome, and that the separation of the soul from the body is only incidental. Arising in Pindar, enacted by Socrates, and transmitted by Plato and Aristotle, the Hellenic conception of immortality contributed this belief to the thought of Jesus' day.

Kant defines the meaning of the immortality of the soul as "an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being."⁵⁸ The idea of an endless rational existence was not new with Kant; the Greeks also believed in it. Pindar had declared that reason was divine and eternal, and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle embraced the view. Kant's advance over Greek thought was the fact that he made explicit the belief in the endless duration of personality, the potential of which the Greeks also had. Jaeger says that "the history of personality in Europe must start with . . . [the Greeks]."⁵⁹ Also Jesus had announced that the divine, eternal soul while in the body, through faith might obtain endless duration, but he did more. Jesus enacted personality as a living experience and that at a time when Jewish culture had neither the concept nor word to express it. Little advance in the formulation of the idea of personality was made until Kant. Holding that "personality is nothing but the freedom

⁵⁴Fosdick, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

⁵⁵*John* 6:47.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 5:24.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 17:3.

⁵⁸Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 263.

⁵⁹Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, p. xix.

of a rational being under moral laws,'⁶⁰ Kant announced that "the idea of the *dignity* of a rational being [consists in] obeying no law but that which he himself also gives.'⁶¹ This statement made the same person both enact and obey the law, a dual activity which Kant connected with the inner sense and the outer sense. Fichte apprehended the fact that this dual activity expressed the nature of human self-consciousness, whereupon he said, "I am subject and object."⁶²

The problem of immortality, then, has attained this stage of development. From the Greek view of Pindar, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; from Jesus' teachings as recorded in the Fourth Gospel; and from Kant's expressed idea of personality, it seems that immortality is an endless existence of self-conscious personality; that immortality is not concerned with the resurrection of the body which arises from and returns to dust; and that immortality is attainable while the soul is in the body and after its release the soul is believed to be at home with the divine.

⁶⁰Immanuel Kant, *Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 24.

⁶¹Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 64.

⁶²Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, p. 67.

Motoring

By JOHN NIXON, JR.

Having no map, we had assumed

Our destination was the tomb.

But at the service station Faith

They told us we could pass through Death—

If we would use *their* gasoline.

We filled the tank. And now we screen

Our eyes from signs, lest one should be

The dreaded word, Apostasy.

“We Must Love One Another or Die”

BY

J. GLENN GRAY

THOUGH history may not repeat itself in any consistent fashion, there are enough repetitions to induce sameness of mood and feeling in millions of people. How many veterans of World War II, I wonder, have been compelled to relive in memory during these recent disastrous months half-forgotten war experiences of six or eight years ago! Reliving such experiences, usually somber in nature, can be distressing and fruitless enough, but it can also be occasionally rewarding. For the meaning of a past experience is sometimes lost to us, unless chance events force us to re-experience and thus discover its meaning for the first time. Doubtless many a veteran has found new significance in those lost war years since the news from Korea has been flooding in, significance that might well have been hidden forever, had the United Nations gone unchallenged in the Far East.

Curious and unaccountable are the things we remember from our individual participation in a great war. Chiefly we remember what seem to be little things: an incident, a face, living or dead, a landscape, a peculiar quality of misery, joy, or weariness. They are frequently all that is left to us of months or even years of war experience. Of course, they only seem to be insignificant. Etched deeply in our consciousness, they possess the power to haunt us by recurring to mind at unpredictable intervals. It is as if by this recurrence they were reminding us that we have not fathomed their meaning. Like food, they require to be digested, made part of the continuity or the blur of existence. Frequently we cannot integrate these re-

membered moments because they are too meaningful and disturbing. They demand that we change too sharply the normal patterns of living and thinking. We cannot understand because we are not willing to do what is necessary. Hence much of our past remains incomprehensible to us; so much of us remains fragmentary and incomplete.

I have been vaguely troubled for five years by the recollection of a certain evening I spent in a village in Alsace during the last war. The memory has more than once brought over me contradictory feelings which are hard to describe: something between a chill of dread and the warmth of blessing. Only lately has the experience begun to take on something like fulness of meaning. Perhaps a brief description of the situation is necessary.

The division to which I was attached as a counterintelligence soldier had been in action for months without a break and was constantly on the move. We had come all the way from the beachheads of southern France. Now the winter had overtaken us on Germany's borders. The German defenses were stiffening: it was the eve of the Battle of the Bulge. SS troops on our front were fighting bitterly for the frozen Alsatian plain, burning the villages they could not hold. Refugees were coming through the lines in a flood, making intelligence work of my sort heavy indeed. The village of Ribeauville, in which I was stationed temporarily, was receiving occasional enemy shells at unpredictable intervals.

It is hard to express the peculiar nastiness of those days and nights in early December 1944 at Ribeauville. Worse than the cold and damp, the danger from shelling, and the physical weariness was the police work I had to do and to watch. The fanatical hatreds of the newly formed Alsatian Maquis seemed more cruel and unrelenting than that in France proper, where the Resistance groups had been in existence for years and had suffered. Their zeal in wreaking vengeance on German collaborators, real or alleged, went beyond bounds. People who had been seen talking to Germans were liable to arrest by these vigilantes, and to be pushed into overcrowded, unheated prisons. Because Alsace had been incorporated into the Third Reich since

1940 and its administration entirely Germanized, it was inevitable that almost everyone had "collaborated" to some extent. Everyone consequently feared his neighbor; it was "the war of every man against every man." To join the Maquis and arrest collaborators was one way to insure your own safety and also an opportunity to gain revenge on personal as well as political foes. In short, the hatreds of this rich, but eternally disputed land, expressed uninhibitedly during these first days of liberation, were sufficient to make even the callous heartsick.

I was alone that evening in our temporary headquarters, the front room of an abandoned private home, tired and dispirited. A mail delivery had been made during the day and among other things I had received a recently published book of poetry by W. H. Auden, sent me by a friend from home. After piling wood into the ancient wood stove and pumping our gas lantern, I sat down to read Auden's poetry. I was vaguely conscious how much I wanted and needed the release of beauty, which poetry had often brought me in this war. Tonight it would have to be something exceptional to lift me out of the ugliness of this existence. But Auden proved not to be easy reading. His obscure and inverted syntax, difficult words and images seemed too great an effort and doubtfully worth deciphering. It appeared that he was just another of these moderns, voicing his private visions and dreams.

But suddenly, after a period when I read without making the effort to comprehend, my eye was caught and held by a single line. It seemed to leap from the page and grip me with its utter simplicity and naked truth:

"We must love one another or die."

Yes, that's it, I found myself saying excitedly to the empty room. We must love one another or we shall surely die. It is as simple as that. There is no third possibility. That is the lesson of this war, of these past months of hell. Like revealed Scripture, the words were stunning in their impact, their completeness, their naïveté. It seemed

suddenly clear and self-evident that this vast misery and unhappiness in me and all around could be dispelled by love and by love alone.

Then the impossibility of this alternative struck me with equal force. What a fantastic lie! I said once more aloud. No force under Heaven can make men love one another; not these men and women I have seen torturing one another during this last year in Italy and France. Die they certainly will one day, but love one another . . . ? God Himself could with difficulty induce them to forgive, not to speak of love. Even the word is utterly lost to them, the sentiment itself unknown. Looking within myself I could discover no feeling or love for anyone around me. Yes, I felt pity at times for our poor devils at the front and for the miserable refugees I interrogated, but occasional pity could not pass for love. Friends whom I had in the States, in that other life, did not seem real any more. There was really no one I loved with any great force, no one at all.

There must be millions like me, I concluded without much evidence but with conviction. It seemed unlikely that all of us should die, except in the course of nature. Did not history teach that men were always like this, the majority of them? And the race had survived so far, the unloving possibly longer than the loving. In all probability many of us would live through this time and go our unloving ways to an eventual peaceful death. All of this pain and hatred would slip unnoticed back into the past, already overfilled with such things. Unregenerate man would stumble on. Why then had this line, "We must love one another or die," appeared on first sight to be so profoundly true? Was its wisdom so hollow as it now sounded in my ears? I would not answer the question nor could I recover for an instant the radiant belief of the previous moments.

The line did not help me to get through the night, though I realized that this evening had a special quality about it which would lift it out of a thousand nondescript army nights. The war finally ended, as all wars do, with no access of love among vanquishers or vanquished, and I returned to civilian life in America. Auden's words receded to the background of my consciousness, there inspiring at

times a feeling of urgency about the state of the world, at times a sense of doom impending and about to be pronounced on our civilization. Common sense assured me constantly that the alternative Auden proposed was false; if wars ever did cease, they would cease as a result of causes other than the growth of love.

But since the war in Korea this line of poetry has come more and more into the foreground of my being, demanding explication. Gradually it has assumed a depth of meaning and significance totally hidden from me that night in Alsatian Ribeauville. The poet's words, I now see, are not intended to be taken literally. Like all genuine revelation, they are concerned with an imaginative truth of greater significance than any literal truth of fact. Not physical death, but the death of the spirit is the consequence of not loving. Not mere existence, but partaking in a life distinctively human and humanized is the implication of love.

Seen in this light, Auden's line contains an old truth, repeated by most of the great poets and inspired philosophers of our Western heritage. Why then have I had so much difficulty in grasping an idea as ancient as Plato and Jesus, as modern as Schweitzer and Gandhi? The answer seems very simple: I could not grasp the significance of Auden's words at Ribeauville because I conceived love too narrowly and sentimentally. Love meant to me then hardly more than a particular passion, uniting and also dividing individuals in accordance with wayward, unpredictable fancy. Its power and sweetness I comprehended, but its presence or absence could hardly appear synonymous with life or death.

I have come to see, however, that a radical change occurs when love as a particularized passion is transcended and transmuted into compassion or concern. For an attitude of concern or compassion implies that I am caring for, protecting and guarding—not solely my family and friends, but human beings as such. Concern, which in origin signifies “mixing together,” is perhaps the word which has fewest sentimental associations and at the same time expresses the universal dimension of love most clearly. To be concerned is, accord-

ing to dictionary definition, to be related to, or belong to, to be implicated in. And love, interpreted as universal concern, seems to be what unites the individual to the whole of mankind.

Is it not the only thing, imperfectly realized always, which prevents us as individuals from bumping randomly and violently into each other, as physical atoms were supposed to do in the theories of the early Atomists? There are, to be sure, many other bonds of association holding us together as groups, societies, and nations, but is there any bond other than love to bind the individual to mankind? The bonds which unite the individual to his group are surely of a qualitatively different sort than the bond of universal concern. The former build tribes, clans, states, and federations; only the latter builds a community.

The true lover, if such a one can be in this sense, feels a responsibility for taking care of and preserving the simply human. He sees himself involved in the whole human story, not abstractly but intimately, and he has for men wherever he finds them the same feelings of concern which the majority of us have only for our immediate families and for friends. There are, of course, infinitely many approximations to true love. Most of us have sympathies too narrow for more than rare moments of such concern. But when these moments come we realize how qualitatively different this sentiment is from what, in modern times, usually goes under the name of love.

To love, in this universal sense of the word, is to live, and not to love is to die. If this be true, spiritual death consists in isolating ourselves from the bond of community, becoming as individuals or groups governless atoms. Doubtless that is why so many figures who moved around me in the war have come to seem shadowy and unreal. The war was doing the same thing to all of us: breaking quietly and relentlessly the bonds of compassion among men. The feeling of group solidarity or comradeship, which the war fostered in many participants, is unrelated, I think, to love as concern. For men can be driven together and achieve unity as the result of fear

or recognition of interest; but community is not won this way. It comes as the unfettered recognition of kinship, the insight into man's universal dimension.

But what does it avail, after all to discover a meaning to Auden's words unless we can do something about the alternative? Is grasping the nature of love as universal concern any guarantee that we can achieve it? Obviously there is no guarantee; to know is not necessarily to do. Nevertheless, there is liberation in understanding, even when the power to change ourselves does not accompany it. Understanding is at least the indispensable guide to right action, and universal love can perhaps only be born in understanding souls. The relationship between what true love is and the achieving of it may well be a closer one than we realize. May not the gap between knowing and doing, understanding and action, close where understanding is directed toward the individual's relation with mankind? For to conceive this relation aright is in some sense already to be implicated, to feel that one belongs to the whole. Sometimes I dare to think that we can almost gain love by the full recognition that there is no other alternative. We must love one another or die.

National and Individual Conduct

BY

HENRY CHARLES SUTER

THERE SEEMS TO BE some confusion these days concerning the relation of individual ethics to national codes of conduct. Is one and the same moral law applicable for the nation as for the individual? While a great deal of thinking is done on this subject, it is feared that most folk take for granted there can be no difference. But a great deal rests upon a correct decision.

When an individual forgives freely, is railed upon but is not resentful, beaten but refuses to become bitter, the world recognizes such as a virtuous spirit. The world is right, since that is the essential element of morality, and so far as conduct is concerned, it is the highest aspect of conduct we can cultivate toward those who hurt us. Can it be that in a national sense there might be a law other than this law related to the individual? It seems to be taken for granted that the law of the unit must be the law of the aggregate; but must it?

Let us delve into it from another direction. Is the nation as the individual? Is there any difference between a people and a person? Is there such difference that determines a law for nation, decidedly discounting and even destroying the law of the individual? In short, can the nature of the meek and mild demanded in the individual take the same place in the life of a nation or a people?

Now, there are two things true about a nation that can hardly be said about a person. One difference is that a nation exists only in time. It is of the earth, earthy. It is temporal. Nations have arisen apart, developed different traits and territories, aspired to diverse

ideals and aptitudes, had various histories and hopes, lived by numerous philosophies and moralities. There is a different brawn, and a different breed; into our bodies a certain brand, and into our spirits a salient coherence setting us apart from others. In our nature has come a liking for localities; factors concerning families forced upon us, demanding a particular loyalty that we call patriotism. Being given to segregation, we have turned aside from others into separate nations and civilizations. We cannot ask how it came, but it is here, and whether by divine decree or not, we feel we owe a certain loyalty to this development over the face of the universe. Thus we feel, by doing our duty to our nation, we act the noblest towards many other projects for our people.

We owe our opportunities to our nation, our equipment in life is from its effort, our inspiration from its ideals; but they are by no means the criterion of our quality, and still less of our place in the immortal verity of things. They are conditions destined to collapse, kingdoms of this waning world, scaffolding sure to pass away when the building is complete.

That is evidently the mark of nations, not of the immortal order, passing and perishing like a leaf from the tree of life. But the person is not so, because man belongs to an immortal order. The nation, while but temporary, nevertheless a very real one at present, is doomed to be transcended. Man is a being essential and immortal, with identity to survive. That is the difference, then, between the nature of a nation and the nature of a person.

Can there be bestowed on these different entities the same qualities? Have these different factors in the range of existence the same obligations? Can we be sure the same moral demands rest upon a mundane unit, as upon a unit that is immortal?

This brings us to the second difference between the nation and the individual. A community exists only by compromises. A nation possesses many kinds of persons, in different degrees of knowledge, intelligence, morality, and purity. Only on broad issues can a nation see eye to eye, accepting principles maybe, but with varying aspects

of certainty. Providing all accept the principle, there is bound to be differing about the bearing of such principle upon conduct. Some are for consistency, others suggest, while accepting the principle, that it is not expedient to carry it into effect.

Those with defective intelligence, or intelligence not of high order, do not apprehend many things appertaining to acuter minds. Those who are virtuous and true find themselves at odds with those who look upon moral sanctions as encumbrances. Thus legislation must needs lag a little behind the average position of any nation. Hence the actual working code of morals of most nations needs a persistent pressure from within the spiritual realms, so that it be made better. Thus it lags not only behind known truth, but further behind ideals already appropriated by serious persons. In short, it is compromise. When one says, therefore we should not legislate, we answer, we must work with things as they are, and not as they ought to be, nor must we despise the actual because we have an eye upon the ideal.

Ideals are for the individual. Hence a person in his own nature becomes ever conscious that he cannot allow compromise, but must needs ever follow the highest when he sees it. Therefore while a nation cannot live without compromise, a person cannot really live if he does compromise. The nation having most skill in compromise amid its factions will have most internal peace and will rule itself; but the man, though skilful indeed in compromise, will surely fail and be ultimately known for no good, first to himself and then to others and finally to the Immortal Judge.

Therefore, the same laws cannot apply to nation as to man, persons being precisely different from communities. The loftier the laws, the longer they take to work out. The more moral and spiritual in aspect, the less it will be found possible for them to pass upon nationalities, since nations have no immortality in which to reap.

Now let us return to where we started as to meekness and forgiveness. Are these graces proper to nations? Do they not possess powers that make them incongruous in the nature of nations? When

we dwell together as nations, we are all guardians of another person's rights. We each have a duty to our neighbors, to the community, as regards its unity as well as its futurity. We cannot consider ourselves as alone, for when we do, we fail in a duty demanded of us, as well as break the bond by which the nation is bound.

Here is a simple illustration. Suppose, at a period of distress, the directors of our banks, corporations, and syndicates should meet as specific boards or committees, and without consulting shareholders or stockholders decide among them to present all assets to the government. Without consulting anybody else, they meet in the official capacity they possess and agree to present a magnificent gift. What would the shareholders say to such a board? Among other things of course unprintable, they would surely say something like this: "You could rightly give what was your own, but have wrongly given what was ours, since even if we would agree upon such a gift, you have forestalled our consent, robbing us of practicing personal philanthropy." Probably no board of directors would perform such an act, but if a nation's rulers show to another nation, which has wrought wretched mischief upon their subjects, meekness and forgiveness, have they not betrayed a trust, proved unjust stewards, and given that which was not theirs to give?

A man has a right to sacrifice himself, and give away that which is his, but he has no right to sacrifice another, or give away that which belongs to someone else. A man may let himself be killed by an enemy, but he has no right to let an enemy kill his fellow-citizen, he standing by and looking meekly on. We must defend one another in national life, and though allowing the matter to go as it may so far as we are concerned, we must not let any circumstance go that affects others as much as, even more than it affects us. Should we say a nation does well to be humble and forgiving, and, as its rulers, be meek and mild for the nation, will there not be danger and confusion in such vicarious meekness?

We must remember that in a community we each belong to one another, and recall that when we are defending one another, meek-

ness and mildness are out of place. They are peculiar to a man's action for himself, but when he is a trustee, which involves others, he must possess a sense of justice. Justice is the foundation of a nation's existence, its oracle of establishment, its instrument of stability. The nation is a mutual trusteeship; hence, when defending another, to be meek and mild is to mistake the situation of its status, and to be confused in its character of duty.

A final illustration. You catch a thief and hand him over to an officer of the law, expecting he will be tried in court, and others in your neighborhood are thus protected from his further depredations. Suppose you meet the officer some days later and speak about the case, and he answers there will be no case, since he felt sorry and sympathetic towards the thief and let him go; what would you think of such an officer?

We probably need not apply all you would say about the matter to the question in hand; but possibly it is plain that while the duties of forgiveness and meekness may be assumed by the individual, they must not in the same sense be applied to the nation; and in some of the overtures of our present time applicable to national and international affairs we shall undoubtedly cause confusion and calamity if we are not clear in our contentions amid the grave concerns and circumstances that every individual everywhere faces at the precarious period of any people.

The Father of Finnish Prose

BY

MILDRED MCGILVRA

NO ONE in Finland really knows what the father of modern Finnish literature looked like even though he has been dead for less than eighty years. True, there is a larger-than-life bronze statue of Aleksis Kivi in the Railroad Square in Helsinki, besides numerous other busts, portraits, and statues throughout Finland. Curiously enough, these are all imaginative works based upon the sketch made by a friend as Kivi lay in his coffin after having suffered a long, wasting illness.

Aleksis Kivi has a unique distinction in this northern democracy where, prior to his time, lived a great romantic and paganistic literature, and where, after his time, has blossomed a literary culture equal to that of any modern nation. He fused two great periods in his native Finland—a land where the very language of long vowel sounds lends itself ideally to versification and liquid prose. This is the place where 1939's Nobel prize-winner, Sillanpaa, still writes in a masterful style, and where Aale Tynni brought home the Gold Medal (first prize) in poetry from the London Art Olympics in 1948. It is also the land from which recently has come *The Egyptian*.

The immortal Kivi wrote at a time when the progress of Finnish literature had been retarded by the censure ordinance of 1850, which restricted the publication in Finnish to books on religious or economic subjects. He was native to a country which had been part of the Swedish empire for five and one-half centuries, and where it had not been permissible for lecturers at the University of Helsinki to

use their native tongue until 1863. It was not until thirty years after Kivi's death that Finnish was established on an equal level with Swedish as the official language in Finland.

The father of Finnish prose was a man of many gifts, and at the age of twenty-five he brought out the first tragedy ever written in the Finnish language—*Kullervo*, an adaptation of a murder from the epic *Kalevala*. This play with its many faults was so critically received that any ordinary man would have despaired in his work. But not Kivi, who revised and republished it five years later, the date of which is now considered the birth of modern Finnish literature.

While he was still at the University of Helsinki (1864), he brought out his next attempt. This time a master emerged in his own realm. His art conveys his courageous conviction that literature is life, and so was born Finland's immortal comedy, *Nummisuutarit*, the first comedy ever written in the Finnish language. *The Cobblers of the Heath* (English name of the play) is a mundane drama of simple peasant folk as the author knew them in his boyhood village of Palojoiki. It is a realistic play, full of satire and humor, and is still being played in Finland. It was featured at the 75th-anniversary festival of the national theater in that country. It is frequently given by community and school dramatic organizations, and even J. Paasikivi, Finland's president, has performed in it in his younger days.

What prompts a person to write drama when any opportunity for displaying that talent is not feasible? For at Kivi's time there existed no Finnish theater, and it was not until eight years after the publication of the *Nummisuutarit* that the Finnish theater became regularly established. Perhaps it is a genius who, endowed with superlative gifts, creates for the love of beauty and truth and not for expediency and success. Many of the structural faults in Kivi's dramas are weaknesses arising from the fact that he never saw any of his own plays acted except by small university groups. The legitimate stage by its nonexistence could offer him no help.

It was in the works of William Shakespeare that Finland's first realist found the greatest fascination. Ignoring the Swedish cultural

influence, Kivi was not a success at the university. Instead, he obtained all of Shakespeare's dramas, in the Hagberg translation, and wore the books thin in studying them alone. Here, he felt, was his blood kin. He studied playwriting with great intent, leaning heavily upon England's romantic master. In many of the aspects of humor, Kivi was like Shakespeare, but in morality, he differed widely. For the Finn fused realism into his romantic outlook on life, and it is in the homey details that this quality is the most noticeable. His, also, is the healthy approach to living. In his plays one can feel his very heart beat, and his soul cry out, for this lonely man lived every one of the parts. But the more he studied Shakespeare the more interested he became, until the university no longer held its charms. This soulful man then went back to a one-room cabin in the country, determined to write in Finnish about the Finnish people.

At the time that Kivi was writing, Finland was in the "golden age" of Swedish literature (1830-1863). One after another, masterpieces of prose and verse blazed forth to win the applause at the literary head-tables. First there was Topelius, romantic and idealistic, producing everything from stories for children to historical prose and musical lyrics. There was Finland's classic master, Runeberg, who hallowed idealism and venerated patriotism of the noblest kind. His legends breathed of the loftiest sort of heroism. And there was Elias Lonnrot, a philologist, emphasizing literary form and a purely artistic language in his ballads and folklore. He discovered and collected the *Kalevala*, one of the world's great epic poems. Finland was still deep in a classically cultured and romantic period—almost a warrior-and-paganistic literary period—although the outside world was turning to realism. To this setting came Kivi, to launch for himself a miserable career. So miserable that it cost him his mind and his health.

Kivi had his awakening not in these native men of letters but in the great writers of the renaissance. In the works of Shakespeare and Cervantes, primarily, he found what he wanted—a rich imagination, strong humor, the freedom of looking at their own people, and a

courage to picture the real thing. Kivi was like Cervantes in portraying human experience, untrammled by the affectations of a courtly style, but where Cervantes was outside the sphere of realism, Kivi was in it. Kivi's works have a down-to-earth flavor not found in *Don Quixote*. Rabelais influenced some of Kivi's writings, but where the Frenchman was loud and racy, the Finn was soft and good-natured.

After Kivi forsook Helsinki for the simplicity of the country, he created the masterpiece that was to be loved and honored by every Finn—*Seitsemän Veljestä* (*Seven Brothers*), the first original Finnish novel. It was brought out in 1870 and has been translated into many languages, including English.

Seitsemän Veljestä is also an epic of Finnish humor, and any Finn knows that the book cannot be read without its provoking laughter in the reader. It is a gigantic novel, first planned by the author as a play, in which seven boisterous brothers, ranging from the ages of eighteen to twenty-five, leave civilization for a life in the wilderness. In the wilds of Impivaara, these brothers, who are both dumb and wise, bull headed and good-natured, poetic and stoic, finally conquer their barbaric souls after nine years of primitive adventures. It is a book of fiery blood, smacking of romantic tales and anecdotes, and at the same time strongly realistic in the Northerner's severe outlook on life. At times it is as gusty as Rabelais, as fierce as the bulls that roar in it, and as lusty as any swashbuckling hero. Yet its characters are true to life, smelling of sweat, raw and uncouth, and vigorous in their struggles to subdue the forces of nature. It looks at religion in a freedom of spirit never before attempted in Finnish literature, and in it allegory mingles effectively with the commonplace. It is like thunder roaring and lightning flashing when the might of these bellowing men wrests their lives from stubborn nature and wild animals, and they submit themselves to the discipline of a more civilized community. The symbolism in the book is partly responsible for its universal appeal. In the broad pictures of this novel stands the whole Finnish race in its hopes and its ambitions.

Kivi's talent was an impulsive overflow of the soul. Never pedantic, nor pluming the renaissance culture of the period, he wrote freely and spontaneously. Through his writings can be felt the presence of his boyhood home, the influence of years of schooling in Helsinki, and the breadth of passion of the home poets who were writing in Swedish. But Kivi was totally different from Runeberg, who wrote according to set rules with his work the outcome of a deep study. Kivi had no inclination to formality. He was not sentimental, or moralistic, and he painted more picture-stories than description. The subjective very often fuses with the objective in good clarity. He also had a third ear, so to say, giving him the ability to tell how words and phrases sounded. The result is a remarkably harmonious style. For these reasons he appeals both to the high and the low, the cultured and the uncouth, and is read by people of many lands, while Runeberg will probably never be read outside of Scandinavia.

Kivi himself thought that of all his works, *Seven Brothers* was his best. He wrote the publisher that he felt he could not remove one sheet from the manuscript, and that the editing was to be done free. In answer, they said that he would receive 700 marks for the novel minus 100 marks for the editing. So acute was his bitterness that one of his literary friends personally sent him the 100 marks that had been charged for the editing. For Kivi was living in the humblest of circumstances with very little food, and even much of that brought in by relatives and neighbors. The 700 marks did not begin to pay his debts. Disappointment, worries, and poor living conditions took their toll upon his delicate health. He attempted some more plays, two partly finished, and a third, *Margareeta*, written in full. But short was his career, and he died at the age of thirty-eight, insane and in poverty. There were but a few mourners at his grave.

Yet *Seven Brothers* continued to be read and acclaimed by the Finnish people. The literary critics rejected the book, feeling that its humor and realism would overthrow their present classical literature. Ahlquist, a contemporary writer and critic, would not allow the book to be translated into Swedish, feeling that it would make

the Finns a laughingstock. But by 1880 the novel had gained a tremendous popular esteem, until the literary and editorial people, one by one, began to read it and admire it.

Kivi's writings are not like the works of later realists or naturalists. He did not tackle any political or economical problems. He took no issue with sex or moral questions. Neither did he touch upon social or cultural arguments. But he did concern himself with the individual and he treated people vigorously. He gave more emphasis and value to imagination. Kivi stands in the midst of his people and delights in their simplicity. He was mainly concerned with the experiences of the peasants. It has been said that he had the head of a realist and the heart of a romanticist, but that in his superb humor the two merge into one.

Most Finnish writers after him have turned to his works as a guide. In the eighties when the tendency was toward naturalism, Finland's foremost writers followed the form of Kivi. What he started was further developed by two of his immediate successors—the dramatist Minna Canth took up social problems of the time, while Juhani Aho, a realist with a delightful style, reached intensity in his psychological portrayals. Then too, Kivi left about fifty esteemed poems of lyrical beauty for posterity to examine. There is no doubt that he is to the Finns what Cervantes is to the Spaniards, and what Jacobsen is to the Danes. As for a comparison in our own country, he is the Mark Twain of Finland.

Notes and Discussions

DR. ROBACK'S "PERSONALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE" AGAIN

In the Summer 1951 number of *The Personalist* appeared a review of Professor A. A. Roback's *Personality in Theory and Practice*. Since the review was a somewhat cavalier treatment of an important book by an internationally known author, it seems only fair to call attention to certain facts respecting Dr. Roback whose work has been enthusiastically reviewed in previous numbers of *The Personalist*. He wrote the first textbook on character and personality which was used at Harvard, Columbia, Yale, and Kyoto. This book, now in the fourth printing of its third edition, has just been issued by Kegan Paul of London in the famous International Library Series.

Concerning it *The New Statesman* of London wrote: "Its comprehensiveness is little short of a miracle; but Dr. Roback writes clearly and well; his book is as interesting as it is erudite."

Professor Katz in the leading German psychological magazine said of it: "Roback's work in every respect represents an imposing achievement. Even the German literature has nothing to compare with it."

The late George Herbert Palmer declared: "On almost every page I come upon something I should like to remember. . . . A book which I so much admire and which has given me so much"

The list of appreciations could be extended almost indefinitely to include Stanley Hall, Titchener, Jastrow, William McDougall, Jelliffe, Morton Prince, Janet, Masson-Oursel of the Sorbonne, Brown of Oxford, Bartlett of Cambridge, which list seems like the calling of the roll of the world's most distinguished psychologists.

It is evident that a review may be a judgment upon the reviewer as well as upon the author reviewed. After all it is only an individual opinion and our policy is to allow free expression as the only safe policy.

R. T. F.

Along the Bookshelf

PHILOSOPHY AND THE MODERN MIND

THE PERSON, or *The Significance of Man*. By Ralph Tyler Flewelling. The Ward Ritchie Press, 1932 Hyperion Ave., Los Angeles 27, 1952. pp. xii-339. \$4.00.

The author is a distinguished American philosopher, known throughout the academic world at home and abroad, as editor of *The Personalist*, as founder of the School of Philosophy in the University of Southern California, as author of *The Survival of Western Culture*, *Creative Personality*, and other significant books, and as one of the two outstanding philosophical exponents of contemporary personalism.

The present volume is a truly great work. It is the most comprehensive and detailed exposition of personalism and application of it to the basic problems of contemporary thought and life that has yet been written. The author has an extraordinarily wide acquaintance with literature, art, science, politics, religion, the cultures of the world, and different ethical systems, as well as with philosophy. Perhaps his most original contributions to the literature of personalism have been in the social and cultural field. But this special interest on his part has never been a detached interest. It has always stood in a close relation to his personalistic world view. And this is particularly true of the present volume.

It emphasizes the fact that personalism is a faith and life, not simply a philosophical doctrine. But the two are never separated from each other. Personalism as a life is grounded in a personalistic metaphysics and epistemology. Both of these conceptions of personalism are impressively expounded and richly illustrated.

The author has a rare literary style for a philosopher, and also a fertile imagination. It is a delight to read what he writes. He keeps close to the needs and interests of the modern mind. One of the most significant and impressive features of the book is the way in which it exposes the superficiality and inconsistencies of the current materialism or naturalism. In this respect it renders a great service to the cause of religious education. For this day of bewildering and confusing theories concerning man and God it is a splendid introduction to a sound philosophy of religion.

Boston University

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE. By Lewis Mumford. Harcourt, Brace & Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. ix-342. \$5.00.

The Conduct of Life brings to a close the series of books begun by Lewis Mumford in 1934 with *Technics and Civilization*. It has been a great series but the latest is perhaps the greatest of all. The author, because of the breadth of his grasp, has a right to be considered among the prophets of our time.

He considers the age of the machine to be over, for we cannot save our inventions unless we save man, and if we save man, the human person—not the machine—will dominate the scene. The expectation that mechanical progress will automatically improve human conditions is subject to wry possibilities has been illustrated in Hitlerism, is under trial in Stalinism, and is even now in process of defeat. Man, the self-fabricating, unfinished animal, once dismissed from scientific consideration, is now becoming the chief concern. We are learning that the failure to cultivate the inner spiritual life engenders a lack of self-confidence and induces an imaginative paralysis that leads to the death of a civilization. In such a state, men can conceive no alternative to their man-made catastrophe.

As do other profound thinkers of our time, the author believes that we must put God at the end rather than at the beginning of things, not forever complete, but in process of completing experience. He believes that the world as it is drives honest souls to atheism but fails to see that the concept of a living and growing God, the suffering of the Divine with his creatures, gives an entirely different cast to the drama of being. Exactly this was the primary message of Jesus of Nazareth, and that which differentiates Christianity from paganism, though Christianity has not generally grown up to this truth and has remained largely pagan itself. Here lies also the charter for affirming the further truth that the presence of the Divine Spirit in the life of the Man Jesus indicates the incarnation by that Spirit in every human life that lives up to its spiritual possibilities. Here we have the reason for affirming the Deity of Jesus, but it also presents us with the universal character of religion destined to bring together eventually that universalism which Mumford deems so necessary to the rescue of civilization. He rightly declares that "every attempt to capture divinity in some permanent form ends by imprisoning the spirit of man," by tying him down to his present understanding of God. But this need not be if life is a co-operative movement of God and man, and the Divine Personality is to be considered incomplete without the salvation of man. If this Divinity is thought of as Spirit, the spirit of man may well represent the field of its operation, and all good and all righteousness, though assumed voluntarily, may be considered as the fruits of that Divine Spirit. Here we believe rests the source of that renovation of the world through the renewing of persons for which our author so longs, and in which he so thoroughly believes. Here is the universalism that lies at the center of a new integration of life.

One might well wish that every human being might read this book with understanding, for it could hasten the coming of a new day. No thoughtful man of our time can afford to forego its message.

R. T. F.

WILLIAM JAMES, *The Message of a Modern Mind*, by *Lloyd Morris*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1950. pp. 98. \$2.00.

Lloyd Morris' small volume in the Twentieth Century Library Series has a special timeliness for a day that is awakening to a new concept of the im-

portance of the person in knowledge and especially in the life of the world. He presents the salient facts of James's philosophy in the same intelligent and unobtrusive way as did that author. James was quite aware that the simple and popular style he chose would be anathema to many academicians, but it ensured his being widely read by intelligent people who were not fond of philosophical dialectic. It is noteworthy in how many ways James managed to forecast the thought of the future. His doctrine that truth is not final until the last man has had his say; that the laws of science are approximations; that orthodoxy in science had become the symbol of arrogance and vulgar success, and finally his distrust of formal logic. It was Charles Renouvier's personalism that saved him in his own hour of personal despair, and philosophy became a very practical thing to him. He expressed a wish to develop a theory of life that would fulfil "the desire of the heart to be a match for the whole universe, and not shrivel to an infinitesimal accident within it." To this he added: "The way is open to us—we walk at our risk." His pragmatism meant chiefly that life is an adventure which goes to those who have faith to take the risk, since truth is our interpretation of experience and can be resolved only by reference to its practical value. To James, religion was the inner citadel of human life.

Lloyd Morris' account of James provides a readable and attractive account of a great thinker and will be welcomed by every lover of William James.

R. T. F.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. Rev. Ed. By *Edgar S. Brightman*. Henry Holt & Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. xvii-349. \$3.60.

A day in which "where freedom still prevails, confidence in the spirit has waned, [where] philosophy has denied its own mission in the attempted murder of metaphysics by logical positivism and a purely analytic method—which is even more negative in its results than the earlier neorealism . . . [a day whose] picture is complicated by the romantic revolt against reason by the existentialists and the neo-orthodox, not to mention surviving fascists." (vii) In such words as these does the officially recognized successor of Borden Parker Bowne voice his "crumb of comfort" at the demand for a new edition of a work first published in 1925.

But Brightman should find more than a "crumb" of satisfaction for, after twenty-five years, the personalistic philosophy is a setting tide toward an almost incredible fulness around the world. Its teachers and proponents are everywhere in evidence; where in 1925 it was scarcely known outside of Boston, it has since then raised disciples on every continent. Such outstanding modern thinkers as Schiller, Carr, Bergson, Berdyaev, Mounier, Maritain, Mumford, and many others have been glad to acknowledge themselves personalists, though with diversified facets of understanding, and many more of outstanding merit in both North and South America and around the world. No longer can personalism be honestly relegated to a single "Methodist" or "religious" university. For this result Brightman himself has been, in great measure, responsible. Not only so but the world conditions which he mentions in his

new preface, have occurred to make the personalistic position stronger every day and the most demanded philosophy of our time in the new universalization in thought—political, social, and religious. All hail to Brightman and this significant republication.

R. T. F.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES. 3rd ed. rev. By *W. D. Gould, G. B. Arbaugh, and R. F. Moore*. Russell F. Moore Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. xiii-220. \$4.50.

During the past twenty years, what was almost a pure vacuum has been increasingly filled with good translations and general textbooks in oriental thought. The fact that this volume has had three printings in five years, the latest involving some revision, indicates that there is considerable interest in philosophies of the East. *Oriental Philosophies* gives an accurate account of some of the outstanding thinkers and schools of Asia, but in light of the popular demand, a considerable amplification would seem desirable and indeed imperative. The omission of Motze, with his astonishing and brittlely argued doctrine of universal love (*chien ai*), is certainly unforgivable; and a bit from the dialecticians (*Ming Chia*) and the political realists (*Fa Chia*), perhaps also Hsüntze, the left-wing Confucianist, would have been desirable. The latter two throw some light on the political-military character of Chinese communism. This book, which apparently has found favor in the classroom, could also be used by the general reader who wishes a first glance at Asian tradition freed from the excesses of cultist glamour.

WILBUR LONG

NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE. By *Lawrence K. Frank*. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1951. pp. ix-175. \$3.00.

"The old order changeth, giving place to new," but is the new prepared to take up its claim? Whether in joy, sadness, or terror, all seemed agreed that things are no longer what they used to be. For Lawrence Frank, "the great social philosopher of our age," the great problem in times of change is out-of-date ideas and ways of thinking. Briefly stated, his thesis is that ideas can be brought up-to-date.

Man's place in his world is developed in clear and comprehensive fashion, analyzed into geographical, internal, cultural, and social "environments." Man is seen not apart from, but as a part of, the total ecological picture. Philosophers will find interesting epistemological suggestions, not developed, on page 37. The sum of "environments" is established as a total field continuum; man is both determined and determining. Each individual (and local group) represents a peculiar focus of the total field, and his representation of this in awareness is his "private world." If these private worlds are derived from a reading of the whole too local in place and time, they are inappropriate. The greatest danger is seen as fossilization, the carrying over of out-of-date patterns of *ethos* and *eidōs*. Today's man is called upon to recover the creative capacity for habit-breaking previously exhibited by the sixth- and fifth-century Greeks and by the Renaissance. We don't have to be anachronisms.

One gets the partially correct impression that the author would meet the needs of our day on the level of improved tools and techniques. Actually he is operating somewhere between the frequently cited tools of science and the adequate *ethos* we are told must catch up with those tools. This book suggests, without extensive development, that a new sense of man's organic place in the universe will provide the necessary confidence and motivation. If only we improve our mental and cultural tool production, our basic needs and aspirations will operate in adequately undistorted fashion.

It is unfortunate that the chapter on "Our Private Worlds" does not go a little more deeply into the dynamics of "world" production. Social anachronism is clearly recognized, but the anachronisms in the history of the individual, the neurotic distortions which become behavioral perversity, are less adequately dealt with. "Sin" *may* be an anachronism, but guilt and forgiveness are psychodynamic facts. Re-education without benefit of repentance and redemption, however secular in terminology, does not fit the realistic field-continuum so effectively presented here. Perhaps the throwing out of the older theological and cosmological notions should have strained the bath water.

Nature and Human Nature is the work of a liberal and courageous spirit. It points in the right direction. Give us more!

DONALD H. RHOADES

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY. By *Rudolf Carnap*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. pp. xvii-607. \$6.00.

The author describes this work as a new approach to the old problem of induction and probability. He develops the theses that all inductive reasoning is probability reasoning; that inductive logic is concerned with logical relations between hypotheses and evidential statements which yield "degrees of confirmation"; that these logical relations are tautological and hence require no contingent presuppositions such as the law of the uniformity of nature.

Professor Carnap takes up anew the controversy between the adherents of the mathematical theory of probability and the adherents of the empirical (frequency) theory, and endeavors to show that each theory represents an attempt to present a clear explication of different (but complementary) aspects of what amounts ultimately to the same problem. Carnap consequently distinguishes two concepts of probability: *probability*₁ as degree of confirmation, and *probability*₂ as relative frequency in the long run. Included under the concept of probability are (a) the measure of the evidential support given to an hypothesis by statements representing evidence, (b) a "fair betting quotient," as well as (c) an estimate of relative frequency when precise information is unavailable. Probability refers to an empirical procedure of determining predictive ratios and is consequently nontautologous.

This is the first of a projected two-volume treatment of probability logic; the second will continue and complete the technical apparatus for quantifying degrees of confirmation. A preview of Carnap's treatment of quantitative

inductive logic, as it will be completed in Volume II, appears in an appendix of the present volume.

This volume appears as a valuable contribution to its subject, and one that students of scientific inference will find to be eminently useful.

GEORGE WATSON

TIME AND FREE WILL; MATTER AND MEMORY. By *Henri Bergson*. 6th impression. Macmillan Company, N. Y., 1950. pp. xxiv-339; xxvii-252. \$2.75 each.

It is somewhat embarrassing to review books of an author whose views are as well known as those of Bergson and whose classic status is witnessed by their sixth edition. The reviewer feels delighted that such is the case and that those valuable contributions to a philosophy of life and of a committed personal existence are kept alive and are again available. In comparing his impression in looking through them now and his impression of them when he studied them thirty years ago, he was mainly interested in noticing this main result: Thirty years ago Bergson's struggle with physicalism seemed to him exciting and necessary; having appropriated it, the same struggle now seems to him overdone, too long, and too belabored.

University of Oklahoma

GUSTAV E. MUELLER

THE "WHY" OF MAN'S EXPERIENCE. By *Hadley Cantril*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1950. pp. xiii-198. \$2.75.

This book is avowedly "an attempt . . . to understand those transactional relationships, still largely hidden and submerged, which account for what order and predictability there are in human life." (5) A "transaction" is not an "interaction" of things really separate from each other; it is an event from which we abstract "things," notably ourselves as observers. The qualifications of so-called "objectivity" are built into the nature of perceptive beings; men do not perceive for nothing, but in terms of over-all orientation and purpose. We perceive that for which we have a more or less ready use. Gradually we build up a set of guiding assumptions—our "assumptive form world." From this we gain surety, and prejudice. We develop confidence that actions based on our value judgments will pay off. Lack of this confidence means worry. The most important aspect of our form world is the form of the "me."

The proper study of mankind is not measurement of isolated reaction-times, but "the whole person adjusting to a natural social environment." (135) Dr. Cantril finds the present "illusion" of the scientific approach to human problems to lie in the assumption that man's welfare lies in increasingly rational intellectual judgments, to the neglect of adequate value judgments. Facts, plus logic, are not enough. The author believes that the capacity for valuation can be trained, and should, therefore, not be left to extracurricular activity.

The "Why" of Man's Experience is both judicious and clear. It deserves wide reading.

D. H. R.

LITERATURE FROM WORDSWORTH ON

WORDSWORTH. Centenary Studies presented Cornell and Princeton Universities. Edited by *Gilbert T. Dunklin*. Princeton University Press, 1951. pp. xii-169. \$3.00.

This small volume brings together seven re-evaluations of Wordsworth presented in public observance of the hundredth anniversary of the poet's death. Three of the essays have been previously published, but they gain interest from being placed with the other four. The series presents a wide span of opinion on Wordsworth's value for the twentieth century.

Professor Douglas Bush's "Minority Report" comes first. He thinks that Spenser, Milton, Chapman, and Greville "whatever their varying poetic power—share a more permanently valid comprehension of the facts of human nature and human life." The reason is that "a conviction of sin is likely to be more conducive to spiritual health than impulses from a vernal wood." He has some doubts about "Tintern Abbey" and "Intimations" but concedes that they are fine poems. These, with a few passages from *The Prelude*, a few nature lyrics, and a few sonnets, are enough Wordsworth for Professor Bush and other "common" readers of our time. Professor Pottle, however, finds a value not so much in particular poems or philosophical ideas as in the influential concept of imagination which enabled Wordsworth to transfigure "the matter of common perception." Professor Griggs, making a biographical survey of "Wordsworth Through Coleridge's Eyes," sees more to praise in Coleridge than in Wordsworth. The friendly stimulus of Coleridge accounts for much of Wordsworth's achievement, and Coleridge's praise first established Wordsworth's reputation. In return, Wordsworth was unsympathetic with Coleridge's best poems, and less than kind in dealing with his personal failings. But whatever defects of temperament Wordsworth may have had, Professor Ransom boldly announces: "Our poet was one of the giants. We cannot say less, for Wordsworth did what Burns and Blake could not do: he reversed the direction of English poetry in a bad time, and revitalized it." Professor Ransom then goes on to give some acute analysis of Wordsworth's technical skill; but beyond the skill he finds in the short poems, "the fundamental earth . . . the foundation stones, upon which if there is to be a religious edifice it must rise." Professor Evans shares this latter view, saying that Wordsworth's unique quality is his "strange and powerful union of experience to vision." Precisely because of the catastrophes of the twentieth century, he thinks, this quality of vision is Wordsworth's most important aspect today. To this, Professor Trilling at first responds that "Wordsworth is not attractive and not an intellectual possibility"—though he finds that Byron and Goethe are so. The reason, he thinks, is that Wordsworth is too Christian, too Judaic, too religious. Yet upon analysis Professor Trilling concludes that this is his strength: "What Wordsworth knew . . . is that life does not have to be justified and feeling affirmed by that which is violent, or by that which is proud: the meanest flower is enough." Dean Sperry, whose anniversary sermon closes

the book, concurs. Wordsworth is still timely. In his solitude he came to a "consciousness of self and a consciousness of God, each independent of the other, yet interdependent and in an intimate mutual relationship." In this awareness he found a capacity to unify the fragments of his previous experience, and a faith in man's unconquerable mind.

Though the volume contains much praise of Wordsworth, the general tone is hesitant and defensive. Wordsworth poses greater difficulties for the studious reader than he did in 1850 or in 1900. That he is so ably discussed from such various points of view as are found in this volume suggests, however, that he will survive the present wars of the spirit.

B. R. McELDERRY, JR.

THE SACRED RIVER: AN APPROACH TO JAMES JOYCE. By L. A. G. Strong. Pellegrini & Cudahy, N. Y., 1951. pp. 160. \$2.75.

The thesis of Mr. Strong's book is implied in the title, a line from Coleridge's "Kubla Khan." It is that *Finnegan's Wake* "is the logical conclusion of the Romantic movement in European literature," just as "Kubla Khan" is perhaps its greatest early expression; that *Finnegan's Wake* is about a dream and Coleridge's poem, we are told, came to him in a dream; and that both works are remarkable for sound. The method of interpretation is also influenced by Coleridge; this time by his statement that "Every work of art must contain within itself the reason why it is itself and not otherwise."

After two summarizing chapters on Joyce's early work, Mr. Strong devotes himself entirely to *Finnegan's Wake*. Chapter III is a valuable discussion of the influence of singing, particularly of Irish song and singers, on Joyce. Mr. Strong is an Irishman, a singer, author of a book on the Irish tenor John McCormack, and does for Joyce what only one familiar with Irish life can do.

Chapters IV and V treat Joyce's debt to Shakespeare, Swift, and Blake, to which are appended lists of allusions to their work from *Finnegan's Wake*. In both chapters there is much that is perceptive, but in neither does the discussion of the quotations get beyond the level of allusion. He writes, "There is in Swift's story something germane to the Irish character, and especially to the situation of the artist in Ireland." But he never works out what that something is. And since one of his purposes in writing the book is to defend Joyce to the Irish, among whom there exists a conspiracy of silence about Joyce, there is a task still to be done.

His evaluation of Joyce's debt to Blake leads into a discussion of the role of the unconscious in Romantic literature, Joyce's debt to the theories of Freud and Jung, and the problem of time in the dream. Strong's treatment of the relation between Joyce's interest in time and his method of arranging materials in paragraphs places Chapter VIII on a par with Chapter III.

Chapter IX is a defense of *Finnegan's Wake* as a work of art: "... it remains a brilliant and formidable feat of literary pioneering to which all future artists in words must be in debt, if only because it shows some things to be impossible." (149)

The final chapter of *The Sacred River* develops the proposition that Joyce's last novel represents a moral advance over *Ulysses*, and that its main interest is theological. Strong does not argue that Joyce finally accepted Catholicism, or any other religion, but that a writer who went about his work with "so mediaeval a devotion, who was so supersaturated with Christian thought and imagery, could hardly fail to express his integrity of spirit in an attempt to unite in his writing what had been so disastrously separated in his life." (157)

Nothing in his argument will convince those Irish Catholics who consider Joyce a blasphemer. To Jesuit-dominated Irish thought the word "religious" implies a body of doctrine and a discipline with respect to God and the church, not an attitude toward art.

The Sacred River is an uneven book. It seems to have had its origin in a series of lectures, written over a long period of time, hastily combined with notes on Joyce to give the semblance of the unity of a book. Only haste can explain the inadequate summaries of the stories in *Dubliners*, in which all the overtones are missing. In some chapters the author's interest in Jung and in metaphysical speculation leads him into discussions which disturb the proportions of the book and the direction of the discussion. But there is so much that is right and suggestive for the reader, that I regret the book failed to maintain the level achieved in Chapters III and VIII.

AEROL ARNOLD

THE COUNTER-RENAISSANCE. By *Hiram Haydn*. Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1950. pp. xvii-705. \$7.50.

Hiram Haydn's book is a protest against the interpretation of the Renaissance set forth in Douglas Bush's *The Renaissance and English Humanism* and E. M. Tillyard's *The Elizabethan World Picture*, both of which stress the continuation of the ideals of Christian-humanism from St. Thomas Aquinas to Milton. Such simplifications he finds inadequate to characterize the nearly three hundred years that separate the crowning of Petrarch with the laurel at Rome on April 8, 1341 and the death of Bacon on April 9, 1626.

He believes that the chronological period known as the Renaissance actually represents three distinct intellectual movements, occurring simultaneously, overlapping and conflicting each with the other. First of these movements is the classical renaissance or humanistic revival, best represented by Erasmus, More, and Hooker, the Christian-humanists. For the second Mr. Haydn borrows the term "Counter-Renaissance" from Theodore Spencer and Robert Heilman to describe a trend represented by Montaigne, Machiavelli, Donne, and Bacon. The third movement, led by Galileo and Kepler, he calls the Scientific Reformation.

The Counter-Renaissance represents a challenge to the medieval synthesis and the principles of Christian-humanism. Its chief characteristic is the rejection of reason as the normative principle of human life. Rejection of reason turned Counter-Renaissance religionists to an exclusive enthusiasm for faith,

scientists to a radical empiricism that denied the importance of hypothesis, philosophers to a denial of "natural law" and innate justice and to the adoption of a pragmatic consideration of "things as they are." "What unites these otherwise dissimilar thinkers of the sixteenth century is that they share completely an anti-intellectualistic, anti-moralistic, anti-synthetic, anti-authoritarian bias." (xiii)

No summary can suggest Mr. Haydn's gift for synthesis, nor the surprise and delight of the reader in following the author through the richest and most complex series of relations and oppositions. The organization of the book is excellent. Occasionally the bones of the structure show; occasionally the rigidity of the structure interferes with a satisfactory treatment of a text or an author. Somehow one feels cheated to have only the pertinent quotation, without all the other aspects of the work which demonstrate the eclectic character of most Renaissance writing. These weaknesses follow from the point of view and the method, and I cannot see how they can be overcome in a work of such dimensions.

The author is more successful in handling expository texts than he is in interpreting Shakespeare. I found his discussion of Shakespeare's plays the least satisfactory part of his study.

The materials on which the study rests will provide bibliographical aid to students of the Renaissance for years to come. Mr. Haydn has read widely in the primary works of Renaissance England, France, and Italy as well as in the chief scholarly studies of the past fifty years. He reprints long, telling quotations to support his contentions. At times the quoted material seems excessive, giving the work the character of a doctoral dissertation. Frequently long quotations reappear. Citations from the same work by the same author appear in different languages. In one case (224) there is a long quotation from Bodin's *Republic*, translated into English. Thirteen pages later Bodin speaks in his own French tongue. Since I read French with ease I did not object; but for the sake of consistency, it seems to me, available translations into English are to be preferred, if translations are used at all. In a work of such complexity and scope readers will find much they cannot accept. Yet no student of Renaissance thought can read this study without being stimulated and enriched. A. A.

D. H. LAWRENCE AND HUMAN EXISTENCE. By *William Tiverton*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. xiii-139. \$3.00.

Under the pseudonym of Father William Tiverton, William Robert Jerrett-Kerr, a priest of an Anglican religious order and a friend of T. S. Eliot, who contributed the foreword, has written a study of Lawrence to demonstrate that "Lawrence can teach Christians lessons they should have known but have forgotten." The point of view is that of a Christian who believes that because "of the abuse that has been hurled at him by so many Christians, it seemed that some amends from that quarter are overdue."

With a minimum of reference to the much-too-discussed biography of the

author, Father Tiverton re-examines Lawrence's work, never losing sight of the fact that Lawrence was first and last a novelist; that profound as his insights were, he was in no sense a philosopher. As the author says, "It was a pity Lawrence had no philosophical training. Considering the lack of it, he finds his way around remarkably well" (106) More than most people who have written about Lawrence, Father Tiverton pays homage to Lawrence's acuteness as a literary critic. Scholars have only just begun to recognize the brilliance of his *Studies in Classical American Literature*, which contains the essay on Poe, recently characterized by Auden as "conspicuous for its insights" (*Selected Prose and Poetry of Edgar Allan Poe*). Everywhere in this brief study the reader finds evidence of the author's fairness. A. A.

THE LAST ROMANTICS. By *Graham Hough*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1949. pp. xix-284. \$3.00.

A review of this book might well bear the title *The Life of the Imagination, Ruskin to Yeats*. In commenting, early in the volume, upon its headings, Mr. Hough asserts: "We shall not find, then, among the writers discussed in this book any one clear direction of thought. What they share is a common passion for the life of the imagination, conceived as an all-embracing activity, apart from the expression of it in any one particular art" (xvi) He proceeds to state that as a result of this passion for the life of the imagination so conceived, these writers share a tendency to assimilate the different arts to each other, to permit an interpretation of their values which will thus form together "a realm of transcendent importance," a realm demanding and deserving recognition as a vital part of the world—the world that is dominated by social and economic values.

The writers discussed include Ruskin, D. G. Rossetti, William Morris, Pater, the Rhymers' Club of the 1890's with their French influences, and Yeats. The earlier romantics, of the Age of Wordsworth, had visited history as intelligent tourists who were conscious of a happiness in their own times; but the group discussed here as the last romantics, beginning with Ruskin, looked at the past as if they had been exiled from it as a happy home—they felt deeply a homesickness for the sense of beauty and artistic joy that they found lacking in the mere physical apparatus of the contemporary world; they were "the last romantics," to use Yeats's phrase, and they chose to discuss glowingly and yearningly in their prose and poetry what he calls "*traditional sanctity and loveliness*" (italics mine).

Mr. Hough considers influences and effects. He deals with a highly complex train of topics, and does so with intellectual incisiveness, sensitiveness, and breadth of consideration. He had become interested in the genesis of Yeats's ideas from those of a small poetic circle in the nineties. He found that this group seemed to owe much to Pater and the pre-Raphaelites, who in their turn owed much to Ruskin. The book was thereafter composed, following chronological order, and it culminates in the consideration of Yeats and our own times. It is excellent in its treatment of *Modern Painters, News from*

Nowhere, Marius the Epicurean, and other prose writings of Ruskin, Morris, Pater, and others, as well as in its account of poetry. With no reflection upon anything else in the book, special praise may be given to Hough's handling of the French influences of the nineties—Gautier, Baudelaire, Huysman, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, and especially Verlaine; also, brief though it is, to his handling of Yeats's masks. Altogether this is a book to delight, in the sternest sense of the word, persons aware of the prose and poetry of England from 1840 to the present. Because of many omissions, the index does not properly represent the richness of the work.

WILLIAM D. TEMPLEMAN

ACHIEVEMENT IN AMERICAN POETRY 1900-1950. By *Louise Bogan*. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1951. pp. 151. \$2.50.

Louise Bogan, poet, critic, and lecturer, has done little in this recent volume to enhance her reputation. In 111 pages of text and 32 pages of anthology (one poem per page) she has attempted to give a critical history of fifty years of American poetry. She has failed badly. For one thing, her publishers have tried to keep costs down and have not allowed her very much to pay for reprint permissions. The result with Eliot, for example, is the inclusion of one small bit in French and "Marina"—this from the most-discussed poet of our day. When one stops to realize what is *not* in the anthology, which, incidentally is not keyed to the text, he has a fair idea of the volume as a whole.

The basic failure, however, is not with publisher's limitations but with Miss Bogan herself. And yet one wonders what anyone could have done with 111 pages of critical history crowded with names and movements. Miss Bogan's answer is to give Jeffers, Schwartz, and Benét five lines each; Ransom, Tate, and Aiken rate one line each; Warren and Eberhart creep in by name only; Bishop, Riding, Berryman, Prokosch, Untermeyer, Hillyer, Leonard, Cullen, Hughes, and others do not appear at all in the text. The omission of the Negroes is strange in a poet who, among other awards, fellowships, and lectureships once won a John Reed Memorial prize!

The history section is recorded with a tired left hand. The publisher's jacket hopefully calls the author's views "fresh"; they are actually commonplace. Miss Bogan's book is elementary enough in tone for a beginner's taste, but sadly lacking in volume; it would be of no use at all to anyone who has done a little work with modern poetry. Compared with such essays as appear in the text of, and the books named in the bibliography of Zabel's revised *Literary Opinion in America*, for example, this little survey would appear ridiculous. It is difficult to conceive for what audience it is meant.

There is only one directly quoted illustrative passage from an American poem of the last fifty years. Surely the author who wrote bright reviews for the *New Yorker* and intelligent articles on folk song and myth for *Chimera* and *Partisan Review* as late as 1943 knows better than this. She has been praised for her metaphysical wit: This book is dull. She has lectured at the universities of Chicago and Washington: This book shows no knowledge of the most prominent scholarly items of recent years. The whole is as perfunctory a

performance from an established literary figure as your reviewer ever hopes to see.

WILLIAM H. DAVENPORT

THE SKY CLEARS. By *A. Grove Day*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. xv-204. \$3.00.

This small volume is based on Professor Day's doctoral dissertation at Stanford University nearly ten years ago. Disclaiming completeness, he attempts to explain the characteristics of American Indian poetry, and to illustrate them through the best translations available. In his foreword he calls attention to the fragmentary records of Indian poetry, the unreliability of many translations, the complexity of tribal organization and tradition, and the resultant difficulty which the general reader encounters in comprehending Indian poetry, even when it is well translated. His method is then to present his selected translations not in a group by themselves, but as illustrations of his commentary. After discussing poems of the Eskimos, he turns to the Indians of the Northwest, the Southwest, the Plains, the Eastern Woodlands, and finally the Mayas and Aztecs.

Since most of the poems were intended to be sung or chanted, the reader inevitably feels that the printed page leaves out a vital element. Probably few readers will "experience" these poems as Professor Day desires. Frequently, however, a phrase will suggest a way of life rich in poetic meaning: "As my eyes search the prairies / I feel the summer in the spring." It is singular how little genuine knowledge most Americans have of Indian life. This book is an attractive invitation to learn more.

B. R. McE., Jr.

CHRISTIANITY, JUDAISM, AND CULTURE

CHRIST AND CULTURE. By *H. Richard Niebuhr*. Harper & Bros., N. Y., 1951. pp. x-259. \$3.50.

Few if any problems have proved more challenging to writers on Christianity during the past two decades than that which occupies Professor Niebuhr in the present volume, *Christ and Culture*. Although his discussion is neither lengthy nor involved, Professor Niebuhr has entered intensively into the multiple aspects of his problem, and while attempting to do justice to many viewpoints has yet been able to reduce his complex materials to a comprehensible pattern that cannot be convicted of oversimplification. In this he had steered quite successfully between the rocks upon which not a few others have floundered. Certainly his comprehension of the historical materials, his insight into the theological and social implications, and his ability at profound interpretations commend his work as of leading significance in Christian history and in the philosophy of culture. What is especially gratifying is that in his terminology and style as well as his argument, Professor Niebuhr has entirely avoided the obfuscation that has characterized so much theologico-historical writing of recent vintage.

Professor Niebuhr discerns five basic positions on the relationship of Christ to Culture, as follows:

1. *Christ against Culture*, the view that "uncompromisingly affirms the sole authority of Christ over the Christian and resolutely rejects culture's claims to loyalty." (45) Though this position is found to some extent in the New Testament itself, particularly I John, and in other early Christian writings, Tertullian is indicated as its best representative in ancient times. Tolstoy in modern. Niebuhr holds that such anticultural Christianity is important for cultural reform but does not of itself produce such reform.

2. *The Christ of Culture*, the view that Christ and Christianity are the fulfilment of socio-cultural hopes and aspirations. Though not uncommon in early Christianity, both Jewish and gentile, especially in Gnosticism, and in the later pre-reformation era, this position is most adequately indicated by the liberal religion designated by Niebuhr as Culture-Protestantism and represented by Ritschl. On theological grounds the author concludes that "it is not possible honestly to confess that Jesus is the Christ of culture unless one can confess much more than this." (115)

3. *Christ above Culture*, the central position that avoids the extremes of the first and second by refusing to confound or separate the "works of human culture" and the "grace of God," insisting that obedience to God must be "rendered in the concrete, actual life of natural, cultural man." (118) Clement and Aquinas, the synthesists, are the representatives of this view, which Niebuhr criticizes for failing to "face up to the radical evil in all human work" (148)

4. *Christ and Culture in Paradox*, the both-and dualism that "joins the radical Christian in pronouncing the whole world of human culture to be godless and sick unto death," but which affirms that man "belongs to that culture and cannot get out of it, that God indeed sustains him in it and by it." (156) Paul, Marcion, Luther, and Kierkegaard represent, in varying degrees, this center position, which Niebuhr complains failed by its inherent conservatism to contribute directly to the improvement of a world considered to be transitory and dying.

5. *Christ the Transformer of Culture*, the recognition of sinful nature expressed in and transmitted by culture, but the insistence that the Christian should neither withdraw from culture (type 1), nor simply endure it while awaiting the miracle (type 4), but rather should transform it. Here the author of the Fourth Gospel, Augustine, Calvin, and F. D. Maurice are the exemplars. Many readers may be disappointed that more attention is not given to Calvin.

In a "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," the author analyzes various aspects of his problem which render inconclusive all efforts to achieve for it a simple solution.

The major criticisms of the reviewer have to do with Professor Niebuhr's critical analyses of the positions which he describes. These analyses are frequently couched in theological contexts and can be evaluated only by a more adequate understanding of his own theology and social theory than is possible

from this volume alone. But these criticisms in no way invalidate the main value of the work, which lies in the careful and effective manner in which he has related the multiple facets of the problem to the complex data of history.

University of Utah

STERLING M. McMURRIN

THE MAN JESUS WAS. By *Max Schoen*. Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y., 1950. pp. xii-271. \$3.00.

Max Schoen received his early training in the Jewish orthodox faith. In the course of his subsequent study he came to a high appreciation of the man Jesus: "The writing of this book was prompted by reverence for the man Jesus and the conviction that in his spirit and teachings lies the only remedy for the numerous afflictions of the present social order." (v-vii)

At the beginning the author raises the question, "Who was Jesus?" In answer he states that Jesus was a Jew and lived and died in the Jewish faith. Yet Jesus was not sparing in his criticism of Judaism: "The essential significance of Jesus rests in understanding how this Jew's love for Israel as the chosen people of God can be reconciled with his rejection of the entire tradition that had brought Israel into existence." (3f) Dr. Schoen feels that the Jesus of history can be understood only if Judaism of the time is properly understood. Jesus came as the inevitable culmination of the development of the religion of Israel. "There had to be a Jesus."

The author shows familiarity with the New Testament materials and with the literary and historical methodology. He draws an accurate distinction, for example, between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics. There are, however, examples of oversimplification: "The problem of selecting the books for the new sacred literature was troublesome. There was full agreement from the very beginning on the Four Gospels, the Epistles of Paul, the Acts of the Apostles, I Peter and I John." (17) One wonders what the phrase "from the very beginning" means in view of attitudes toward Gospels held by Marcion, Tatian, and others, to say nothing of the problem in the second century of what constituted the full list of Paul's letters.

Dr. Schoen, as one might expect, reveals a wide knowledge of Jewish history. With this he combines a fine sense of historical relations. This, I presume, is why he feels that as the culmination of Jewish history there had to be a Jesus. It occurs to the present reviewer that he puts too much Jewish history into his pages and not enough Jesus. I say this at the same time making allowance for the necessity of adequate historical background. But it is possible to become so absorbed in backgrounds as to obscure the main purpose of the book. This, I think, our author has done.

This book does give one a renewed sense of the Jewishness of Jesus together with an emphasis on his transcendent character. It differs from the traditional Jewish treatment of this subject in that it is more appreciative of Jesus. But one wonders if it tells us with much added insight about "the man Jesus was."

ERIC L. TITUS

THE LORD'S PRAYER, ITS CHARACTER, PURPOSE, AND INTERPRETATION. By E. F. Scott. Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1951. pp. vii-126. \$2.25.

The name of E. F. Scott is synonymous with biblical scholarship of the highest order. A new book from his pen is therefore deserving of sympathetic consideration. The present volume contains some valuable insights into the nature and meaning of the Lord's Prayer, but it also presents a fundamental weakness in Gospel interpretation. The weakness, which we shall presently identify, grows out of the all too prevalent tendency among scholars to defend what is the traditional usage of the Christian Church. Scott attempts to defend the position (and this is the weakness mentioned above) that the present Matthean form of the *Prayer* is the original one; that the tendency was to shorten. Perhaps the clue to Scott's reasoning is found in his statement: "The modern criticism of the Gospels has become obsessed with the idea that the teaching of Jesus was moulded into its present form by the later church." (28) The bias of Scott is evident too in his comparison of the Lord's Prayer with the Jewish prayers, especially the Eighteen Benedictions. They are relegated to an inferior status. One feels that if *they* were being interpreted by one as sympathetic with Judaism as Scott is with Christianity, a case could be made for their religious value.

There are, however, positive values in the book. The chapter on Jesus' conception of prayer is an excellent statement. The same is true of the chapter on backgrounds. A discriminating reading of the book, furthermore, will find much valuable material and many valuable insights scattered throughout its pages.

E. L. T.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD. By Emil Brunner. Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1950. pp. xiv-316. \$6.00.

The cloud is already somewhat larger than a man's hand, but this first volume of Brunner's *Dogmatics* still refreshes us as a generation knowing a long drought of dogmatics in the grand manner. Professor Brunner understands by dogmatics that reflective speech about God which ought to follow and again promote the I-Thou experience of Him. Heresy, responsibility for instruction, and the consistent understanding of the *biblical basis* of our confessional faith, all demand this systematic reflection. This book presupposes the author's earlier works, especially *Revelation and Reason*. The treatment builds upon the "givens" of the historical Divine self-disclosure, after the order of Lombard's *Loci Communes*. Historical appendices to the systematic sections give sketchy but welcome background for the issues dealt with.

Discussible particulars being far too numerous to mention, it must suffice to suggest the general orientation of this solid and incisive work. The ever-present contrast of the holiness and the love of God is ably maintained. Of the two aspects, the will to communion of God is somewhat more adequately set forth than is the relation between the distance-producing character of holiness and the possessed obedience which holiness claims. Professor Brunner makes

it equally clear (1) that the doctrine of the Trinity is not, as doctrine, biblical, and (2) that, as doctrine, it provides a real defense of essential Christian faith. He decries the corruption of the Gospel message by philosophical importations of ideas of impassibility, and of nonbiblical eternity, substantiality, and omnipotence. Even the doctrine of the *Logos* he finds early corrupted by "foreign" philosophical notions.

One of the finest statements in the book is that on "election" (319); Professor Brunner purges the traditional doctrine of all necessary relationship to rejection or exclusiveness. At the same time, he denies the legitimacy of either double-predestination or dogmatic universalism.

Of course, one can find fault. His making man part "object," because embodied (140) is certainly open to question. His handling of *agape* and *eros* is consistent but hardly inspired. In three places (249, 295, 352) the name of Duns Scotus is apparently substituted for that of John Scotus Erigena. These are small things in a work which will quickly establish itself as a primary source for Christian dogmatics.

D. H. R.

ESCHATOLOGY AND ETHICS IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By *Amos N. Wilder*. Harper & Bros., N. Y., 1950. pp. 223. \$2.50.

This book is a revision of a 1939 edition. The fact of revision at crucial points, in the light of research in the interim, makes the volume of real significance. One might, indeed, venture to classify this as the classical book on the subject in the English language. This, of course, does not mean that the point of view of the writer is not open to criticism. In fact, the present reviewer finds many points of disagreement, some major and some minor. But the problem area itself is responsible for the element of uncertainty which prevails in discussions of it.

In his discussion of Jewish apocalyptic, Professor Wilder, it appears to me, stresses too much the mythological aspect of eschatology, so much so that it tends to weaken the element of concrete historical expectancy which was certainly a part of Jewish life.

In discussing the eschatological teaching of Jesus, Wilder begins with a review of Schweitzer's position. He then assesses the limitations of his position which have since become clear. According to Wilder, "later study has shown that Jesus taught a present aspect of the Kingdom" (40) One might reply that "later study has *stated* but not demonstrated this to be a fact." However, Wilder states clearly the distinct gains that have been made since Schweitzer's work; for example, the distinction between eschatology and apocalyptic and the fallacy of interpreting Jesus' teaching as an interim ethic.

The chapter entitled "Sanction of the Call to Repentance" is well written. The threatening and promising aspects of the imminent Kingdom provide both motive and sanction for repentance. Wilder is on shaky ground, however, when he affirms that repentance was thought of by Jesus as in some way a factor in the hastening of the Kingdom.

This is a book which sets forth the main issues involved in eschatology and ethics in Jesus' thought and treats them with discrimination and insight.

E. L. T.

THE CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE. By *Edward T. Ramsdell*. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1950. pp. 218. \$2.50.

Professor Ramsdell's perspective is biblical and philosophical, and, in the best sense, confessional. In some two hundred tamped-down pages, he applies his perspective to the central questions of Christian theology. Indebtedness is acknowledged (and self-evident) to Knudson, Brightman, Hocking, A. E. Taylor, Brunner, the Niebuhrs, and Aulen.

Although the book is a well-balanced whole, Chapters I and II, and perhaps sections of Chapter V, will receive closest attention from the theologically sophisticated. The author sees the reconciliation of faith and reason in terms of the problem of perspectives. There is nothing commonplace about his delineation of the prediscursive choice (or assumption) of a governing perspective. The choice of perspective is necessarily an act of faith; discursive logic applies itself to consistency and adequacy of expression; finally a total judgment is passed in terms of coherence (authentically Brightmanesque), a judgment which is essentially a reaffirmation of the now self-consciously developed perspective.

The discussion of paradox attempts to keep the middle course. The author calls attention to both the narrower, Latin meaning, apparent logical contradiction, and the broader, Greek meaning, "contrary to opinion, strange, marvelous." It must be said that most of his illustrations are rather definitely in the "Greek" tradition, and not immediately relevant to the contemporary "paradox" controversy. However, the subsequent discussion defends quite cogently the validity of affirming dual aspects of truths essential to adequate statement of the Christian Witness. The more extreme forms of both rationalism and irrationalism are avoided.

Throughout the book there runs a sensitive and judicious assimilation of Swedish and broadly "Neo-" motifs to a more "liberal" "personalistic theism," insisting on both the divine initiative and the reality of the human response.

The Christian Perspective is solid and good reading, largely blessed by well-phrased and quotable passages. The reader may confidently expect to disagree occasionally, to qualify more frequently, mostly to agree, and all with real profit.

D. H. R.

THE CHRISTIANITY OF MAIN STREET. By *Theodore O. Wedel*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. x-112. \$2.00.

Dr. Wedel, Canon of the (Episcopal) Cathedral in Washington, D. C., discusses in this brief book the difference between "classical" Christianity and "humanist" Christianity. The latter he describes as the "Christianity of Main Street." He makes a plea for a return to the traditional view of Christianity as a religion of salvation. The author has some appreciation for the "popular

conception of Christianity" which admires the ethical ideas of Jesus and speaks of taking Jesus as an example for the good life. Yet, he believes that such a view, where man and not God is the chief actor, is rootless and ends "as a purely secular idealism." He doubts that a religion of mere "Golden Rule idealism" can survive.

The time has come, says Canon Wedel, when the Christianity of ideals "should be reintroduced to its own majestic ancestral faith." This is traditional Christianity with its theology and creeds. It sees in the Bible, not human history, but a disclosure of the divine. It sees in the gospel, not a story of human ascent, but one of divine descent. The central actor is God and not man.

This is a thoughtful book written in a simple and clear style. It is not comprehensive, but the author makes no pretense at its being so. He thinks of the book as merely a "preliminary apology for classical Christianity." Within its limits and purpose, it is stimulating and helpful. The author is far better at his criticism of "humanist" Christianity than in his construction of "classical" Christianity.

GEORGE W. HASKELL

THE WINGS OF FAITH. By *H. V. Martin*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. 132. \$2.75.

For anyone who seeks a simple, authoritative, and adequate introduction to the theology of Kierkegaard, this little volume is about all he could ask for. The analysis of its subject is divided into five chapters dealing with problem, object, nature, and life of Christian faith, and its relation to religion in general. The author, who is intimately acquainted with all of Kierkegaard's writings, treats sympathetically the man who upheld "the Catholic ideal with the Protestant motive." (120) It is curious how the dialectic of thought, of which that Dane spoke so frequently, turned his viewpoint into a rigid intellectualism based on the Aristotelian notion of the excluded middle which makes possible the elimination of all vague lines, all shades of gray, in a religious system of classification of either/or; while Hegel, the *bête noir* of Kierkegaard, in spite of his intellectualism, was the great defender of the objectively ambiguous. Which of the two minds is the better guide in religion, if either, the reader may decide for himself. At least this volume is to be highly recommended for a first glimpse of the thought of a man who has become increasingly important and influential during the past generation. Since Kierkegaard's theology is highly personalized as well as personalistic, the product of a unique individual, a few pages of biography and character analysis of the man would have been welcomed. Moreover the blurb fails to satisfy our curiosity concerning the author himself who has written such a splendid piece of simple, adequate, and comprehensive analysis.

W. L.

BY THE FINGER OF GOD. By *S. Vernon McCasland*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. xi-146. \$2.75.

The author expressed the need for a comprehensive, modern treatment of the subject of "demon possession and exorcism in early Christianity, in the light

of modern views of mental illness. . . . Demon possession means a change of human personality in which the normal self is either dominated or replaced by a demonic self." (66) The point of view which the author presumably uses is, in his words, "scientific, however, with certain qualifications." (vi) According to the author, "The only indubitable instances of real possession in the Gospels appear to be the man in the synagogue at Capernaum who had an unclean spirit (Mk. 1:23f), the demoniac at Gerasa (Mk. 5:2f), and a boy said to have epilepsy (Mk. 9:14f)." (20) Further examples are cited from other sections of the New Testament.

The author seems to accept the basic assumption of the struggle between the demon which has invaded the subject, and the exorcist, to the extent that it appears, at times, that he accepts the psychic reality of demons. (92f) It also appears that, in keeping with this basic assumption, the demonic personality had the ability and perhaps frequently succeeded in outwitting the exorcist when he attempted to eject him by means of some incantation.

McCasland seems to be more concerned with the labeling of certain mentally ill persons than attempting to explain the psychodynamics of such cases. It is impossible to be dogmatic concerning the dynamics of a case about which we know so little, but it is equally dangerous to pin a label to such cases. It would not seem necessary to write a book to establish the thesis that there is considerable similarity between the demon-possession of the past and the mentally ill of today. A greater service might have been rendered had the author helped the reader to see the relationship between personality needs, perhaps associated with religion, and mental illness. Only occasionally does the author reflect the modern concept of mental ill health. (94) Such limited use of modern concepts does not, however, effectively confirm the thesis of the book.

This book undoubtedly will appeal to biblical scholars who have only slight understanding of modern psychological concepts. It may also serve the theologian in developing a more healthful attitude toward those who are mentally ill. The book may, however, be rather confusing so such persons in that no clearly developed concept of what is meant by "modern views of mental illness," is given. To those who have studied both religion and psychology, the book will make only a limited contribution if any.

George Pepperdine College

LEONARD V. WENDLAND

THE HEBREW IMPACT ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION. Edited by *Dagobert D. Runes*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. xiv-922. \$10.00.

In this rich and readable volume of almost one thousand pages, Dr. Dagobert D. Runes has collected the writings of some twenty contributors, every one of them a specialist in his field, and all concerned with imparting to the rest of the world some of the essence and value of the Hebrew impact on Western civilization. The result is a most valuable compendium of what Hebraism had done to enrich, strengthen, and uplift our common culture in practically

every field, but more particularly in those that have the most to do with creating the permanent values of human civilization.

The Jew as scientist, artist, musician, playwright, journalist, jurist, soldier, explorer, theologian, and last but not least, as philosopher is presented here in all the versatility of his peculiar genius. Although many aspects of the more modern Hebrew influences upon our contemporary civilization are interesting and vital because we are more familiar with them, the Jewish cultural influence in the Middle Ages offers one of the most engaging chapters of this uniformly well done effort. It is by reading one after the other of these remarkable contributions that Dr. Runes has carefully and painstakingly put together, that the reader becomes aware of our obligations to the bearers of a great cultural tradition who for almost eighteen hundred years have helped to build our common heritage of Western civilization. Out of the wealth of these contributions finally emerges the rich and colorful pattern of a spiritual, cultural, and artistic continuity of the Hebrew people.

For this book, Dr. Runes and Philosophical Library deserve the thanks and the sincere appreciation of every student of the history of civilization.

A. TH. POLYZOIDES

ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. Edited by *James B. Pritchard*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950. pp. xxi-526. \$15.00.

This book makes available to the general public translations of major extant texts from the Near East within one volume. The editor indicates that two criteria have governed the selection of materials to be included from the wealth of those available.

First, an attempt has been made to include those texts which have, from time to time, been cited in recognized commentaries as parallel to, or illustrative of, certain passages in the Old Testament. . . . Secondly, an attempt has been made in selecting texts for this volume to give representative types of literary expression from each of the linguistic and cultural areas of the ancient Near East.

In addition to the translations, which are excellent, each text has been introduced by a brief statement indicating date, historical background, and, in most cases, where the original source may be found. Numerous brief footnotes also help the reader in interpretation of the texts. . . .

The translators are as eminent a group of linguists and specialists in Near Eastern history and archeology as one could hope to gather for such a work and one must, on almost every page, applaud the judgment and careful work both of editor and translators. Princeton University Press and these scholars have laid us all under monumental debt in providing such a source work which will have value both to the scholar and the general public. From the viewpoint of the linguist, the book would have had added significance had it been possible to print also the transliterated texts in detail, but since this

would have at least doubled the size and cost of the book, it is understandable that it was omitted in a work intended primarily for the general public. As to print, organization, format, care in production, the book leaves little to be desired. Besides the standard texts printed earlier by R. W. Rogers and G. A. Barton, there are added many others which give the general reader a much wider and more thoroughgoing understanding of the various cultures of the Near East. In such a setting the meaning and significance of the Bible become much clearer. This reviewer feels sure that the work will long be standard and come into wide use.

WILLIS W. FISHER

THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF LEVELLER DEMOCRACY. By *D. B. Robertson*. King's Crown Press, New York, 1951. pp. x-175. \$2.75.

This Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, prepared mainly under the supervision of the faculty of Union Theological Seminary, traces in carefully documented form and readable style the religious and political views of a somewhat misunderstood group of English liberals who formed the left wing of the military and parliamentary coalition which dealt with King Charles I during the two years preceding his execution in 1649. The Levellers are studied particularly in regard to the views of John Lilburne, one of their leaders, and are seen to be concerned with the liberties of the individual, especially as related to natural law which to them was almost synonymous with moral law. Although holding the usual views of their age in regard to God's power and man's fall, and often viewing all with an apocalyptic tinge, the Levellers, in Dr. Robertson's reasoned opinion, were both children of the Puritan Revolution and "the first democratic party in the modern world."

EARL CRANSTON

THE REALITY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By *Henry Bett*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1949. pp. 160. \$2.25.

... there is *absolutely no real reason whatever*, in science or philosophy or any other realm of human knowledge, why we should not believe that God guides our lives, and that he answers our prayers, in very strange, unforeseen and unforeseeable ways—sometimes even by what appears to be a sudden change in natural events—and that the revelation of God to men has an accompaniment of miraculous deeds. The concern of these pages is with the supposed difficulties of an intellectual kind in the way of such a conclusion. (11)

The argument is developed with clarity and skill. The bogies of impossibility, incredibility, natural-supernatural hiatus, law as sovereign in nature, mechanism, and materialism, are decently laid to rest. Causation receives a good chapter. This having been done, the believer or would-be believer is free to affirm miracle, providence, and answered prayer.

Dr. Bett insists on a relativistic definition of "miracle"; he even takes issue with F. R. Tennant's *Miracle and Its Philosophical Presuppositions* on this

point. Any event is miraculous from the standpoint of lower levels of reality. No event is actually violative of any principles of behavior; if a "law" seems violated, it is because the law is a generalization which may prove inadequate. In criticizing Tennant, the author seems to miss the point that, for many, the supernatural must "break into" an otherwise quasi-self-sufficient system in order to express the otherness of the divine. Tennant deals with that idea of miracle; Bett redefines "miracle," for the better surely, but does Tennant something less than justice.

This book is, let us say, dialectical apologetic. It is not concerned to criticize the empirical bases for scientific or religious judgments. The validity of alleged experienced guidance, miracle, etc., and of the more-than-manhood of Jesus are taken for granted. The chapter on "The Miracles of Christ" (Chap. VIII) may well give the reader a mild shock. It accepts without criticism so many "facts." Three or four paragraphs would contain about enough of this chapter to fit naturally with the preceding discussion. We commend heartily the first seven chapters; they are well done. The last three, if read in a homiletical mood, need not be omitted.

D. H. R.

IF THIS BE RELIGION. By *Frederick Keller Stamm*. John Day Co., N. Y., 1950. pp. x-116. \$1.75.

Both the cultured despisers of religion and the comfortable adherents of the Christian churches need to read this little book. Dr. Stamm, for forty years a minister, writes: "When the time came that I could no longer go on preaching sermons of a Sunday and watching my church turn away from the challenge of Christian principles during the week, I decided to put my reasons into writing." This is a call to the church to cease being "a country club at prayer." It is an honest attack upon the smugness and hypocrisy of much church-religion.

"Little churches for little people! . . . Churches and preachers with narrow views, selfish ambitions, and a Gospel of expediency. . . . For Protestants to take up the cudgel against Roman Catholicism is like the pot calling the kettle black. There may be little hope for the world in an unchanging Catholicism, but there is just as little hope in Protestantism as it now is."

It is good to know there are ministers of the forthrightness of Dr. Stamm who are working to rescue the church from country club ethics and "decadent ecclesiasticism."

FLOYD H. ROSS

GOD IN EDUCATION. By *Henry P. Van Dusen*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1951. pp. 128. \$2.00.

We have come to look to Dr. Van Dusen for pertinent words on large subjects. *God in Education* is another such word, addressed to the seething issue of religion and education. The problem is seen against the background of increasing separation of the knower from the knowable, beginning more or less with

Descartes. Educationally, this rationalistic tendency has contributed to the atomization against which we are in earnest and uncertain reaction. Core curricula and expanded lists of required courses are the current trend. But the principle of unity still waits explication. Religion has the best credentials, but the practical problems are great.

Religion in education means two things: a religious reference as the unifying principle, and "religion" courses in the curriculum. Since the latter item is the more concrete, it naturally centers controversy. For private schools, decisions can be made on the basis of educational philosophy and enrollment. Tax-supported institutions must come to terms with the firmly established but not too precisely defined principle of "separation of church and state." In a day of revived concern for the education of the whole man, of sought tax-supported benefits for parochial schools, and of projected ambassadors to the Vatican, Dr. Van Dusen's clearly reasoned discussion of "Religion in Public Education" would alone make this book worth-while. Not all will enjoy his discussion of the McCollum case, but all should profit by it. For those concerned for religion in education, especially "higher" education, the bibliography will be an invaluable reference. *God in Education* is a bargain!

D. H. R.

THE BOOK OF THIRTY CENTURIES. By Stanley Rypins. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. xvii-420. \$7.00.

This book, by a Professor of English at Brooklyn College of the City of New York, is interesting, informative, and scholarly without being pedantic. It might really be entitled "How We Got Our Bible," tracing as it does in its nine chapters the history of the formation of the canon.

Dr. Rypins addresses himself frankly in his foreword to serious students who really wish to learn about the history of the Bible, asserting that, while the book may be read with understanding by those who possess no knowledge of Hebrew or Greek, "whatever value these chapters possess can, however, be assimilated only by those who, no longer walking in pre-Darwinian darkness, have seen a great light." One of the best features of the book is its candor and objectivity in the handling of facts and ideas without fear or favor. The author has succeeded in an admirable way in presenting in unprejudiced, non-sectarian sense the chief facts concerning the text of the Bible, its transmission, and translation. The uninitiated layman will find the book a veritable mine of information in reference to these matters and will come away with a new appreciation and understanding of the treasures therein and of the devotion and heroism of its transmitters and translators. It will build in the average reader increased appreciation for scholarly interpretation of the Bible in large measure.

This work is written in well-nigh flawless English, with care, accuracy, and fluency. In its diction and style, it is almost impeccable, and the desire the author expresses in the preface to produce a "book printed without

errata" is as nearly realized as it has been this reviewer's experience to find. It is in almost every way an admirable book, yet the present writer expects the general reader to be somewhat taken back by the rich vocabulary employed and the multiplicity of facts that one encounters on every page. It is not a book to read hurriedly or carelessly. He who reads with meditation, however, will find himself rewarded with a clarified grasp of the significance of the Bible.

In the final chapter on "Higher Criticism," the author makes clear the reason for inquiry into the literary authorship and structure of the Bible and he sets forth the generally recognized conclusions of scholars in reference to crucial problems. It is strange, however, in a book which is aware of the recent discovery by the Hebrew University of the "Dead Sea Scroll" of the book of Isaiah, to find almost no reference to the importance of the studies appearing in the last twenty years dealing with the indigenous culture of Canaanite Baalism and its illuminating bearing upon Biblical interpretation. In fact, the bibliography fails to include many standard books of first-rate importance and is notably lacking in those published between 1930 and 1950. One misses, for instance, such names as Barton, Finegan, Graham and May, Oesterley and Robinson, Gaster, Gordon, Leslie, Olmstead—to mention only a few.

The tables included at the end of the book are interesting and worth while, giving as they do an easily grasped summary of the extant manuscripts available for the study of the text of the Bible. The indices seem adequate. All in all, the book will repay study by the general reader, and the scholar will frequently find the appended notes helpful.

W. W. F.

CONSTANTINE AND THE CONVERSION OF EUROPE. By *A. H. M. Jones*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1950. pp. xiv-271. \$2.00.

This is an excellent study in the "Teach Yourself History Library." It draws upon the original sources quite freely without losing itself in incidental details. In his use of the relatively large number of documents from the age of Constantine, Professor Jones is also willing to use Eusebius' *Life of Constantine* which in some quarters is alleged to be a forgery of some unknown writer living fifty years after the time of Constantine.

On the question whether Constantine's conversion to Christianity was just a matter of policy or of religious conviction, the author claims that it was "in a sense a religious experience but not a spiritual one. To have been a rationalist in that age, Constantine would have had to have been an intellectual prodigy, whereas the evidence indicates he was "a simple-minded man." By some freak of nature the emperor could have been a skeptical freethinker; but on no rational calculation of interest would Constantine have chosen to profess Christianity, since the Christians represented a tiny minority in the empire. Constantine was much more interested in the power of deity than in the ethical implications of the Christian calling. ". . . He was no saint: his relations with his God were regulated by fear and hope and not by love." Constantine undoubtedly influenced profoundly the history of the Church.

Few would disagree with Jones that "the effect on the Church was mainly bad." The emperor's inept efforts to produce concord in the Christian churches of his own day, even through use of the police power, laid the groundwork for a long line of official ecclesiastical efforts to "make" people "Christian" through un-Christian (inhuman) ways. Professor Jones's well-written account of this phase of Christian history should have a wide audience not only among students of Christian history but also among general readers. F. H. R.

JOHN WESLEY'S JOURNAL. As abridged by *Nehemiah Curnock*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. viii-433. \$3.75.

John Wesley's Journal is one of the great autobiographical documents of all time. Since it was written from shorthand diaries—Wesley and his brother Charles had studied shorthand with John Byrom, the poet, who called him "Pope John" to his face—it was intended for the public and is consequently not altogether adequate for a complete knowledge of the man; although it is probably more so than most of that sort of writing. Unfortunately, the editor of this abridgment, the scholar to whom we are indebted for the definitive edition of the *Journal*, has purposed in this volume to popularize a Wesley myth. He presents Wesley here as an almost superhuman person, devoid of romantic interest and completely sterile of any advance in, or vacillation of thought after Aldersgate. Thus the Sophy Hopkey affair, by silence, makes the Georgia predicament unintelligible; and the unsuccessful romance with Grace Murray, which broke Wesley's heart, is omitted. The editor even eliminates the terse announcement, three years later, that he had married the Widow Vazeille. We are not informed that the significant footnotes on pages 35 to 40, from Wesley's pen, are added insertions made some thirty years later and indicated a basic change of theological outlook. Also absent is the celebrated entry of December 30, 1767, which announces a definitive move of thought towards latitudinarianism, and acknowledges once more the ponderous influence of William Law. The format is not up to standard: the book, which was printed in England, is of small type, lacks incisive clarity of impression, and uses an off-color paper; so that the whole is hard on the eyes. For popular reading, however, this book will no doubt serve a very useful purpose.

W. L.

ROMAN SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN ART. By *Emerson H. Swift*. Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1951. pp. xx-248 and 48 plates. \$10.00.

Of great significance to architects, artists, and students of human culture is this beautiful and scholarly volume by Professor Swift. It is of particular interest at the present time when the distinctions between Eastern and Western culture have become increasingly subject to investigation. The general public has for many years accepted the mandate laid down by later scholars that, despite the creative genius of Rome in the field of governmental and social organization, it was quite deficient in most other lines. The dictum has been carelessly applied to the fields of literature, philosophy, and art in

the creation of contempt for things Roman. Professor Swift presents us with a detailed and documented refutation of the commonly accepted theory as applied to the so-called Byzantine architecture. He is able to point out that this type of building came in with the Roman ascendancy and was primarily represented in the Christian basilicas of Hagia Sophia and of Saint Mark's, Venice.

Many of the experts, as well as those who, like the reviewer, have unquestioningly accepted the theory of the Oriental origin of the domed basilica, may now have to revise opinions in the light of the vast and scholarly evidence here brought forth. It would seem impossible for any but the most familiar with the field to controvert the evidence set forth that Saint Sophia was the crowning achievement of a development that originated in Rome. When we search for examples in Oriental art to illustrate the beginnings of three-dimensionalism, the expression of depth and space, the effort after perspective, we find them strangely wanting. On the other hand, we discover in Western architectures a step-by-step progress leading to the Byzantine style. It seems but natural that the Roman arch should lead to the discovery of the pendentive or spherical triangle of masonry—stone, concrete, or brick—fitted into the angle formed by two equal arches set upon adjacent sides of a square. Professor Swift's investigations indicate that convincing evidence of a similar and earlier discovery in the East is quite lacking.

In the progress of the discussion the author leaves few stones unturned. After a preliminary examination of the dignity of Western architectural achievement in the Byzantine, the Romanesque, and the Gothic, for which modern eyes and taste need no apology, he gives extended space to the pagan predecessors of the Christian basilicas, the central and cruciform churches, and the Roman heritage in the Byzantine buildings. He sets forth the use of arches, vaults, and domes; the achievement of atmosphere through color and form; the development of Christian symbolism, and the narrative style. Finally, he traces the rise of new spatial concepts. All these, and more, are faithfully considered and traced to Western origins. The work is profusely illustrated with figures, drawings, and plates so that the work acquires an interest, not only for the professional, but for the intelligent general reader.

This inexpert reviewer must confess to the passing of some very dear prepossessions concerning the relation of Western to Oriental cultures which, in the light here presented, are incapable of justification. He must leave the maintenance of the conflict to those better prepared to continue it, but he cannot discover any decided objection to the assumption that Roman arch and dome are the products of the Western spirit of life and progress.

However, as one thinks of St. Mark's, Venice, one of the buildings under discussion, and recalls the first impression of Oriental splendor in the profuseness of ornamentation, questions arise that will not down. Whatever one's personal opinions are, it is indubitably true that no future writer on this subject can leave this presentation out of account. It should be in every library, cultural, architectural, or philosophical.

R. T. F.

RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE. By *Christopher Dawson*. Sheed & Ward, N. Y., 1950. pp. xvi-286. \$3.50.

In *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* Christopher Dawson presents us with a valuable volume in which he seeks the peculiar factors which differentiated the achievement of the Western man from that of other cultures. What new element was there in it which was not present in ancient imperialism? This difference is disclosed as being the missionary character of Western civilization, a characteristic stemming from the presence and dominance of the Christian faith. This factor made possible the tension between spiritual and temporal interests which resulted in Western progress. Ambrose, Augustine, Leo, and Gregory, he calls the fathers of Western culture, through Augustine's philosophy of history set forth in *The City of God*, Ambrose's contribution to liturgy and the rise of liturgical piety, along with the organizing competence of Leo and Gregory. The novel idea brought through Christianity into the political world was the proclamation of a king other than Caesar which introduced a new era in history. The relation of Augustine to monastic development and the great work of Gregory in respect to the Benedictine order in the final assimilation of the monastic institution by the Roman spirit and the tradition of the western church is clearly set forth. Of Gregory, Vossler, in his *Medieval Culture* (Vol. I, 73), wrote that he "continued the work of Augustine by further developing fear of God into a veritable dread, and, on the other hand, lowered pious hope to shrewd calculation, and utilized it for ecclesiastical purposes." The Carolingian Age established the Benedictine rule as the universal standard of religious life in the West and the missionary effort laid the foundations of the universities and their attendant cultures. These results were strikingly at variance with those of Eastern Europe where these influences were notably lacking.

Whenever Christendom seemed to falter, it had, according to the author's view, in order to recover its dynamic energy only to return to the Augustinian tradition in theology and philosophy with their intense burden of inherited evil under which the human race labored.

In general our author maintains his thesis of the dependence of Western cultural development upon the Christian religion. More credit should be given, however, to the valuable contribution of the heresies and reformations which were no small part of Western progress. Even the despised and half-crazy Catharists could not be assumed to have deserved military extinction and massacre which our author seems to treat rather complacently as necessary to the preservation of vital religion. Even the persecuting and ascetic Bernard could say of them: "abstinent sed abstinent haeretice," which means it is well to practice asceticism but it must not be done "heretically."

All of which unfortunate happenings came from the belief that opinions can be compelled and that "good men," according to their own beliefs, are justified in doing the compelling wherever they have the power. R. T. F.

PROBLEMS OF THE DAY

THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES. By *Karl R. Popper*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950. pp. xii-732. \$7.50.

This "critical introduction to the philosophy of society and of politics" fruitfully covers, with commendable erudition, an amazing variety of important topics. Well over one-third of the book is taken up with notes which often add stimulating insights or point to significant related bibliographical material.

Popper contrasts the "closed" or tribal society characterized by submission to rigid customary taboos, and the "open society," in which men seek to base social decision on rational analysis. The major attack of the book is against historicist social philosophies which assume that history is determined by specific laws. These philosophies, he believes, have been obstacles to the development of the open society. Because of the prominence of this interest, Popper also refers to his book as "marginal notes" to a "history of historicism." Out of the background of this sort of analysis the author attempts certain applications to modern social policy, advocating "piecemeal social engineering" as opposed to "Utopian social engineering."

Strung on these chief threads the book provides comments on a great variety of subjects, including the history of Athens, the problem of definition, the relationship of natural and normative laws, the relation of the individual to society, state regulation of industry, the sociology of knowledge, and the philosophies of Whitehead and Toynbee. The major approach to the problem of the book is, however, through an examination of the social philosophies of Plato and of Marx, with a sizable section on Hegel between the two.

Plato's historicism is found in his enunciation of the law of decay. He also felt, however, that historical destiny could be broken by the moral will of man, by the establishment of the arrested state, in which change no longer occurred. In such a static state the superiority of the ruling class must be beyond challenge. This made of it a closed society, the political program of which was fundamentally identical with totalitarianism. Plato engaged in "Utopian engineering," assuming that one must fully know the comprehensive goal before taking the next step. This must always lead to dictatorship, Popper feels. Plato's ideas of Justice, Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, and Beauty are considered at length. While there are some appreciative words concerning Plato, the major emphasis is highly critical, both of content and motives. Popper feels Plato to have been dishonest in presenting what was essentially a propaganda approach to support his own claim for kingly power.

Hegel is held to be "the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism," the "missing link" between Plato and modern totalitarians. A man essentially untalented, Hegel, through his emphasis on the dialectic, wished to stop all rational argument and to defend inequality and dictatorial nationalism. "Thus the formula of the fascist brew is in all countries the same: Hegel plus a dash of nineteenth century materialism (especially Darwinism in the somewhat crude form given to it by Haeckel)."

Marx demonstrates the purest and most dangerous form of historicism. Marx aimed through scientific study to predict the future course of politico-economic events, which he felt to be determined by man's relationship to his material environment. While his stress on the influence of social conditions did make a contribution to the autonomy of sociology, he oversimplified the role of classes and their relationship to the state. What is valuable in Marx is due to his institutional analysis instead of his historicist method.

In connection with the discussion of Marx, Popper makes one of his central positive contributions in a defense of democratic procedures as a protection against accumulated power, both political and economic. Such a democracy he would have moved by the rational decisions of men toward more humanitarian conditions by focusing on specific problems as they emerge.

The chief criticism to be made of the book is that it becomes unduly polemic at points. Though one may be tempted to overemphasize to correct too great previous appreciation, the attack on Plato seems too harsh. By contrast, the criticism of Marx, while devastating, is moderate. In spite of this, however, the work is a solid and stimulating treatment, providing continuous flashes of illumination on important contemporary issues. HARVEY SEIFERT

VERSUS: REFLECTIONS OF A SOCIOLOGIST. By *Henry Pratt Fairchild*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1950. pp. xvii-203. \$3.75.

Admiring friends, colleagues and former students of sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild have sponsored the publication of this collection of essays, selected by Fairchild from among his many other writings. The eleven essays appearing here have been previously published in magazines and professional journals in the years ranging from 1915 through 1937. Strangely enough, perhaps, nearly all of the themes and their development still have much meaningfulness for the present, or it might be said even more precisely, that the central theme, suggested by the title, *Versus*, is universal and one of the realities for all time.

In the first essay, "But You Can't Have Both," Fairchild declares that "the really devastating antithesis of life is found, not in the choice between good and evil, but in the perennially recurring and inescapable necessity of choosing between two goods and two evils." Hence, he could say in 1934 that which is even more strikingly realistic in 1952: "Liberty, Equality and Freedom. . . . So popular were they in their day and so convincing, that the political and social structure of the United States was built upon them as the bedrock of reality. Yet taken together, they are thoroughly incongruous and incompatible."

With nice precision, social philosopher Fairchild argues that any social system that attempts to apotheosize the profit motive is doomed to recurrent calamity and eventual catastrophe since "profits are possible only when they are so widely dispersed that there cease to be any profits at all." You can't have profits that mean very much if you really want equality! Neither can a nation promote a huge population and expect peace unless it sees to it that its production leads reproduction by a good safe margin. And what if we want more individual liberty with security? More liberty for the individual might well

bring about the destruction of liberty for the less strong; security, if that is what is desired, means that individual conduct must be subject to ever-increasing control in the interests of humanity. Only the strict application of all the intelligence that human beings may be able to muster will aid in the solution of these many problems of *Versus* in our lives.

MELVIN J. VINCENT

FROM WEALTH TO WELFARE. By *Harry K. Girvetz*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1950. pp. xiii-323. \$5.00.

Classical liberalism was influenced as to method by the physical sciences, and modern social sciences also have accepted, as far as possible, the mechanical principles of the physical sciences. Classical liberalism was based on four psychological assumptions, namely, egoism, intellectualism, quietism, and atomism. The functions of the classical liberal state are summed up by the author as preservation of order, enforcement of contracts, promotion of exchange, freedom of competition, promotion of meliorism such as handing out doles, promotion of class suffrage rather than popular suffrage.

In the second part of the book the author takes up a discussion of how classical liberalism has given way to contemporary liberalism which, by borrowing ideas from anthropology and social psychology, attacks the four above-mentioned psychological principles of classical thinking. It "shows up" the shortsightedness in spending \$615,000 in the United States in research in that most fatal group of diseases of the heart and blood vessels, and \$31,000,000 in the same year (1944) in advertising cigarettes. Under such circumstances the most vaunted sovereignty of the consumer is dubious.

Because of urbanization and industrialism the masses are acquiring the power to demand and receive a voice in government, and government reaches out through the establishment of bureaus to help the masses. The recent increase in the power and scope of government "reflects the multitudinous wills of nameless men beyond mention." But bureaus are vulnerable; they can become "little tyrants and big toadies."

However, owners and managers are not above criticism, for they would manipulate the power of government "in terms of their conception of the public interest," which with exceptions, is colored by the desire to preserve "their economic position in the social order." At this point the contemporary liberal expresses the belief that genuine and widespread private enterprise "should be scrupulously preserved," but this is not "the collective, quasi-public enterprise of the great privately controlled corporation." Current liberalism is certain that something far-reaching must be done to preserve real individual freedom for all, but the suggestions vary from "strict controls" of "big business" to converting "private power based on ownership of large-scale enterprise into public power." Co-operatives are mentioned as a possible means of developing the larger freedom of all individuals. At this point the concept of welfare is brought to the fore, but the author does not mean welfare as a "mere device for promoting capitalism or averting mass unrest, but an end in itself and as such the foundation of all social morality." To this end a mixed economy

is advocated in which private ownership of small and medium-sized business is maintained, and in which businesses that have become so powerful that they threaten government should come under public ownership, extending from the central government to local governments. The new liberalist refuses to build a philosophy on either "the demonization of the state" or "the deification of private enterprise." He seeks a democracy which is a fraternity in which all persons are "free of both political and economic bondage" and free to develop the potentialities of their own personalities.

The reader will find that Dr. Girvetz has courageously and in all sincerity tackled basic and far-reaching problems of the day. In the spirit of the freedom which democracy makes possible, he seeks to make plain, without resorting to emotionalism, name-calling, or any of the other subterfuges of the propagandist, some of the main aspects of freedom which in his opinion must be preserved if our country or any country so dedicated can live.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

MODERN FRANCE. Edited by *Edward Mead Earle*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951. pp. xiv-522. \$6.00.

This is one of the most timely books because the collection of some thirty separate contributions by a galaxy of students and writers on French history and development constitutes an indispensable wealth of material regarding contemporary France. Opening with an introduction by André Siegfried, this well-documented volume gives the reader most of the material he requires in order to understand what makes France the nation she is, and what are the basic reasons and factors that have shaped the traditions, habits, customs, and peculiarities of one of the most vital nations of continental Europe.

By-passing the opening chapters, the greatest value of the book is that it helps to explain one of the most intricate systems of political life and action in Europe; it goes deep into the origins of the multiple political parties that have played havoc with the Third Republic (1875-1940) and are not sparing the Fourth (1946-to this day). However, the book is not a dry explanation of the political tricks by which governments come to power, stay there for a while, and then move out to give place to their successors; on the contrary, we find more than one explanation of the many facets of French life, economic, social, and cultural. The chapters on the French intellectuals, and those dealing with the Communists, De Gaullists, and middle-of-the-road parties are especially interesting. The chapter on Georges Sorel, the celebrated author of *Reflections on Violence*, is one of the most readable. Equally interesting and refreshing is the one devoted to the French businessmen and their ideas and methods.

Although written before the last general elections, this volume helps clear up many misunderstandings existing in America about the fundamentals of present-day France and explains the reasons why so many foreign diplomats find it extremely difficult to get the French to do something France simply refuses to accept as being in her own interest.

Modern France is something of a *must* for anyone who wishes to clarify his thinking about our great friend and ally across the Atlantic. A. T. H. P.

TITO AND GOLIATH. By *Hamilton F. Armstrong*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1951. pp. xi-312. \$3.50.

When Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the distinguished editor of *Foreign Affairs*, sits down to write on the Balkans, he is certain to produce a very readable volume, and the present book is no exception to the rule. He knows the Balkans and Central Europe, both past and present. In this book he tells us the oft-told story of the rise of Tito and the events in Yugoslavia during and after the war, and he devotes a large part of its contents to an explanation of the various details of Communist infiltration in the Balkans during the last conflict, and the manner in which Tito, mainly through the influence of Stalin, first became the master of his country, and then the first rebel against the Communist rule of the Kremlin. The story is told in a simple and engaging way, and then it takes us into the impact of Titoism throughout the Soviet satellite East European Empire.

Because the author has attempted to crowd too much history and the account of too many countries into a single volume, not all phases of the Communist crisis in Central Europe are of equal significance and strength. However, for the reader who wants to find out what it is all about, *Tito and Goliath* will offer some very interesting material written in a very readable manner. A. T. H. P.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOR. By *James T. Culbertson*. Wm. C. Brown Co., Dubuque, 1951. pp. xii-210. \$4.00.

According to the author there are two streams of thought responsible for the nerve net theory of behavior: (1) The mathematical biophysics of the central nervous system, and (2) the communication engineering of computers and servomechanisms. Only within recent years have these two trends of thought come together to produce the science of cybernetics which deals with the facts of communication in animals, machines, and man.

Part I of the book deals with so-called "pure nerve net theory." By pure nerve net theory the author means constructing one hundred and seventy hypothetical nets explaining what takes place in the input, throughput, and output of the nervous system. These hypothetical nets are to be accepted in principle but not in fact since they are given with the intention of supporting the thesis that a completely mechanistic explanation of behavior is possible. "Applied nerve net theory makes the claim that all human behavior—habitual, intelligent, learned or unlearned, gross bodily movements or intricate vocal cord movements or hand movements while writing, etc.—are completely mechanistic, and that all the input-throughput-output involved in human behavior is ultimately analysable in terms of a general science of communication engineering." (162) The implication seems to be that if we know the neuronics

structure of a given nerve net, we could, hypothetically, construct an electronic device to duplicate such a net including its behavioral properties. (58) If the structure of a net were known, none of which are at present known, then its functional properties could be computed. The author claims that, while no nerve net is as yet known, . . . "there is no behavior for which there is no nerve net explanation." (151)

Theoretically the author attempts explanation of such psychological phenomena as phi phenomena, differential responses to light and color stimuli, recording and recalling, and others. "The nerve net theory of behavior as it applies to humans holds that all behavior including the type of behavior which gives evidence that a man is thinking is a purely mechanical or mechanistic process, and that properly constructed machines could think just as well as humans." (160-161)

Part II of this book gives the application of nerve net theory to the experience of consciousness. This is a section of some forty pages in which the author fails to make explicit how nerve net theory explains that neural activity which gives rise to such conscious experiences as seeing, thinking, etc.

The book is a combination of simple physiological psychology and complex abstract symbols. The effectiveness of the author's use of symbolic logic in explaining the various nerve nets is doubtful. The author takes the liberty of using some standard physiological terms, such as neuron, nerve cell and synapse, in redefined terms and while they are redefined it is nevertheless confusing at times.

Dynamic psychology has emphasized the fact that man's behavior is distinct from other behavior in that it is purposive and thus different from that of machines. The author's blunt insistence that ". . . goal directed, purposeful, and teleological mechanisms have actually been built and new ones are being built," is certainly suggestive of the need to rethink the nature of man and the uniqueness of his behavior if nothing more.

L. V. W.

ESSAY ON HUMAN LOVE. By *Jean Guitton*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. xi-243. \$4.50.

It seems that once again we are in an age of transition, this time with accent on love. The present essay is largely the product of endless discussions among prisoners of war, with benefit of retrospect. The viewpoint is influenced, sometimes crucially, by the certitudes of Roman Catholic orthodoxy. The treatment begins with some historicity of ideas and expositions of love, together with some questions as to the future. Contrary to the view of Anders Nygren, the author holds, in more or less Augustinian fashion, that there is "but one love" (92), though this affirmation awaits progressive proof in increasing understanding.

If any single thesis is fairly representative of the book, it is that love, especially as involving sexuality, is no longer submissive to the control of instinct, nature, and established convention; it is suffering the "invasion" of knowledge and freedom. The disintegrating analysis and manipulation by intellect (page

Bergson) threatens to separate sexual love from procreation, and even from "for life" marriage. That is, these perennial aberrations may become rationalized and socially respectable. As a philosopher, the author looks to the eventual reintegration in love of this knowledge and freedom. In his more dogmatic contexts, this hope is scarcely discernible; the emphasis is upon the necessary protection of men from their own incompetence, if necessary at some cost of the possible experimental achievements of the few.

The traditions of mystical idealism and romantic passion are well handled, but the more "personal" I-Thou *ethics* has not been assimilated. The reference to Freud, misleadingly elaborated with Jungian concepts, had better been presented as Guitton's personal eclecticism; it is not standard brand.

With this, from his concluding paragraph, we can freely accord: "We do not know in what kind of world we shall live. . . . What we do know is that human love has not completed its career" (237)

D. H. R.

THE BOOK ABROAD

De la vraie et de la Fausse Conversion suivi de La Querelle de l'Atheisme. By Léon Brunschvicg. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. pp. 264. 500 fr.

Among the great masters of the Sorbonne who educated the academic generations of two World Wars, Léon Brunschvicg was one of the most influential. He was the philosopher par excellence of the Third French Republic expressing, in higher sublimation, its humanism, intellectualism, its faith in human progress through modern science, its laicism, and its gospel of tolerance. Brunschvicg, who died in 1944, was the last great idealist among French philosophers before the realistic movements of phenomenology, existentialism, and neo-Thomism won the spiritual leadership in France. According to this thinker, our intellect does not face an independent reality but tries to grasp itself in its own movement, its autonomous activity, which is that of the creation of physico-mathematical science. Although Sartre wrote that with the Nazi invasion, Brunschvicg's rationalistic philosophy had to disappear, because it could not understand the absolute irrationality of evil, a Brunschvicg renaissance is going on now. In France several books have appeared about his philosophy, the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (Paris) and, most recently, the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (Brussels), dedicated special issues to the memory of this great thinker and noble personality. The American public too is becoming more acquainted with his ideas—thanks to the efforts of men like Paul Schilpp, Howard McElroy, Jacques Havet, etc. Brunschvicg's books are re-edited now in France. The new edition of his *Philosophie de l'Esprit* has been followed by the present volume.

In the first part of the book the author replied to the critics of his monumental work *Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale* with a wealth of erudition. In the history of the human mind, he distinguishes between the childhood and the maturity of mankind. If the former is the age

of myths, of "acousmatic" belief in oral tradition, the latter is the age of mathematical science. In the author's eyes, Aristotle and his followers tried to perpetuate man's childhood, its "*fides ex auditu*," while the way of true knowledge goes from Plato over Descartes, Galileo, Newton, and Kant to Einstein who definitely banished intuitive qualities from the realm of science. From this basic conception of the history of our mind springs Brunschvicg's distinction between the "right" and the "wrong" conversion, the former, according to Plato's metaphor, being the progress from darkness into light; the latter the return from light into darkness. . . .

"The Quarrel of Atheism," forming the book's second part, is reminiscent of Fichte's fight against those who accused him of atheism because he only recognized God as the moral world order and not as its personal cause. . . . Also Brunschvicg's theological conception is opposed to anthropomorphism and substantialism. "Strange to any form of exteriority, God is discovered in our conscience alone, as the root of the values recognized by all consciences. He is the foundation in us of the *caritas humani generis*." (209)

In the French Republic of 1928, Brunschvicg's stand did not have such drastic consequences as Fichte's had in the German monarchy of 1799. The Catholic philosophers Étienne Gilson, Maurice Blondel, Edouard Le Roy, and Gabriel Marcel attacked his position and their arguments are fully reproduced in the present volume. But theses and anti-theses were presented with extreme courtesy and with the highest respect for the opponent's convictions, showing the high moral level of France's intellectuality. We have to thank Professor Raymond Bayer, editor of the collection *Philosophie de la Matière*, where the book appeared, for having united those dispersed pages in order to give to a larger public an idea of one of France's most distinguished thinkers.

ALFRED STERN

Philosophie de la Volonté. By André Darbon. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. pp. 169. 500 francs.

The present work is a posthumously constructed text by the editor, René Lacroze, from certain manuscripts prepared by Darbon for his courses and also notes taken by one of his students in the Faculty of Letters at the Lycée of Bordeaux concerning the nature and essence of the will. A consideration of the will poses numerous philosophical problems: Is it a basic function in itself or does it go back, in the last analysis, to desire or inclination? Is it free or subordinate to a psychological determinism, of which one could find the law? Does it express the foundation of our being or is it dependent upon other faculties, particularly the intelligence and reason, so that its decisions obey a kind of logic and its acts resemble practical judgments, or even may it be only the judgments themselves translated into action? The entire discussion represents an attempt to answer these questions. Darbon's conception is not essentially different from the modern conception of discipline: holding one's self to a course of action over difficulties and obstacles in view of a goal intelligently held. Instinctive tendencies and passions, as well as emotions, give the

impulse to action, but in man they have often become so distorted and unsuited to his environment that regulation is necessary. The same may be said of habitudes or dispositions to action, either inborn or acquired. In spite of the familiarity of the subject, the book is stimulating and gives new insights.

MERRITT M. THOMPSON

La Pensée et la Vie. By Jacques Paliard. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. pp. 314. 700 francs.

The present work is divided into three parts: Psychography, Principle, and Psychonoematic. The general purpose of the discussion, the author tells us, is to present the view which he holds concerning the problem of the thought which is implicit in the stream of perceiving consciousness and to unfold a certain logic immanent in it. Psychography represents a descriptive study of this consciousness. Since this domain to be described has no limits and includes feelings, memories, and the organization of ideas, all of which are modes of perceiving, he gives this part of the study in the form of a "Soliloquy of Consciousness," which is an introspective analysis of his own thinking over many years. In the second part, he works out analyses and broad outlines sufficient to determine the Principle upon which the logic of perception is based. In the third part the author attempts to give applications, that is, the detailed account of the structures of perception which have been rendered more intelligible by their relation to the Principle.

In spite of the introspective and psychological concreteness of the discussion, it is an abstruse and minutely worked out study of the dichotomy, "appearance and reality," the former being conscious perception and the latter a certain logical order immanent within it, in other words, "life and thought."

M. M. T.

Traité des Valeurs. By Louis Lavelle. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. pp. 751. 1,200 francs.

The author of this extensive and exhaustive work tells us that it is only in our own days that an autonomous science with the proposed name of axiology has been constituted. But the search for value is as ancient as reflection itself. The latter poses the problem of value from the time that it asks concerning existence whether it is worth being lived or not, whether the diverse ends of its activities are worth being pursued or not, and even whether the different objects which one encounters in the world are worth our attachment to them or not. Every philosopher has implied an answer to this problem, but it is only in modern times that it has been isolated and separated from purely metaphysical speculation and related to all the needs and aspirations of man. That all great philosophies are philosophies of value is proved by the fact that all of them give rules of thought and conduct, attempt to determine the nature of truth and wisdom, and distinguish between reality and appearance, that is, recognize a hierarchy of value within the different forms of being. The purpose of the present study is to discover the significance of the idea of value

taken in itself and to present the varying acceptations given to it in language and history as well as the controversies arising from the antinomies developed.

In conclusion, value has its root in desire; in fact it may be defined as the supreme desirable. If desire vanishes suddenly, value vanishes with it. But it is a desire which is transformed into willing; when one desires that which he wills and wills that which he desires, it is love. Value is indiscernible from the spirit in action. Value is the spirit bent back upon itself in its own operation. One does not justify it since it is the principle of all justification. If the spirit is the supreme value and the source of all values, it is the values themselves which teach us the value of the spirit without which they would be nothing. Thus value cannot be attached exclusively to one aspect of the act of evaluation. It is the spiritual significance or essence of every thing and every action, the true world of every being. Every man acquires value in the measure that he becomes a spirit, that is to say, as he acquires inner being for himself, the inner aptitude to justify himself and become self-sufficient. Everyone creates his own world of beauty or ugliness, the world which he inhabits. That is not to say that value is relative, but, to the contrary, each being by his own act of participation in the absolute creates some sort of absolute of himself.

M. M. T.

La Valeur Moral. By Roger Daval. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. pp. 201. 400 francs.

Of books concerning the nature of value there seems to be no end. Perhaps it is well that there should be this perennial interest since mankind has not learned yet to seek those ends which come back to him in deepest enrichment and most profound satisfaction. Controversy has long raged as to whether value is absolute or relative, inherent in object or attributed by the subject, and so on. But the attempt has always been to localize and define it in specific terms. It is possible that the entire quest thus far has followed a mistaken path. It may be that a different type of metaphysical basis would give new light. The author of the present work suggests a beginning when he says: "From all evidence, the attributing of positive value makes sense only in relation to the previously well-defined situation of the person." (13) The subject of the book, however, is not merely value, but moral value. Thus certain conditions must be indicated which satisfy the moral judgment. These conditions may be attributed to any one of the three elements in the evaluating process: the work, the end, and the agent, the work being considered as produced by the agent and as aiming at a certain end. Finally the foundation of every moral value is found in the ambivalence of the end; the positive sign of value aims at the creation of a universe of conscious beings, the negative at its destruction. (166)

M. M. T.

La Poésie. By Benedetto Croce. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. pp. 248. 600 francs.

This book, with the subtitle "Introduction to the Criticism and History of Poetry and of Literature," develops the theme that poetry represents a unique

and inviolable art field of its own that should never be confused with that of the other arts or intellectual areas. For example, the author is greatly disturbed by the attempt to find an intimate relationship between philosophy and poetry. The former neither has nor can have any power over the latter and in fact brings death to it when the attempt is made since the world of criticism and reality signify death to poetry. He says:

Serious philosophic thought, very different from this abstract or mythical contemplation (of poetry), is judgment, that is to say, consists in thinking about the effect of ideas, categories, concepts, but uniquely in the judgment of facts; and this judgment implies qualification in the distinction between the real and the unreal, a judgment which precisely poetry does not and cannot make in its intrinsic blessedness. (14)

One must even distinguish between the poetic aspect and the practical aspect of the man-poet, never deriving a conclusion concerning one from the other. The "source" of poetry is always the soul of the poet, never things, or words, or even the verses born in the souls of others. The process is intuitive and reflective thought does not participate in it. The author develops his thesis in detail through comparison of poetry and other fields as well as definition and historic criticism.

It seems to the reviewer that there are two weak points in the argument. First, as Vivante in his *English Poetry* has well pointed out, one finds philosophical insights in poetry as a mere matter of fact and these insights give depth and power to the poetry. Second, the argument fails to recognize the difference between philosophical concepts, principles, etc., and the method by which they were arrived at. Professional philosophers are certainly men who exercise reflection or rational thought primarily, but they at times arrive at their conclusions or philosophical insights through intuitive processes even as do the poets. The exclusive quality of poetry would seem to be a highly debatable proposition.

M. M. T.

Actas del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía. Edited by Luis Juan Guerrero. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina. 3 vols. pp. 2,197.

From March 30 to April 9, 1949, there was held at the National University of Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina, the First National Congress of Philosophy, an extraordinary occasion designed primarily as a conference on philosophy for the Spanish-speaking countries of the New World, but delegates were invited to participate from Brazil, the United States, and Canada, as well as the major countries of Europe. Many distinguished names familiar to the readers of *The Personalist* were included. The congress was called and subsidized by the president of the republic and placed under the general direction of the minister secretary of state and the Department of Justice and Public Instruction. The present work is the record of the Congress and includes all addresses given in

the original languages with translation into Spanish of those in English and German.

The theme of the discussions related to the nature of the person, education, and human relations with special reference to the national ideology. The general sessions dealt with the six following topics: philosophy in the life of the spirit, the human person, existentialism, contemporary philosophy (in the individual countries), philosophy and society, and homage to great figures whose centenaries were occurring. Specialized section addresses were given under thirteen headings: metaphysics; actual situation; existence; logic and gnosiology; axiology and ethics; psychology; aesthetics; epistemology and nature; history, culture, and society; education; law and politics; history of philosophy and Argentine and North American philosophy. No attempts were made to summarize drifts or trends as between different speakers, although individuals gave such in their own areas. The whole conference represents a vast body of philosophical thinking covering just about the whole range of man's intellectual life. To analyze it for generalizations or summarize it would be an almost impossible task. Perhaps a typical North American impression would be that of Professor L. L. Bernard of Pennsylvania State College who was present and gave a paper on *Trends in North American Philosophy*. He said in part:

The growth of North American philosophy represents a continual struggle between an attempt of an independent people facing the facts of American frontier life to adjust their thinking realistically to their life conditions and the traditional philosophies of the old world. On the whole, but not completely, realism has won the battle against traditionalism. One of the main results of this struggle has been the redefinition of philosophy, which still constrains itself within the Greek conception of love of wisdom, but denies that the true pathway to understanding is speculation, *a priori* thinking, and casts its lot with empirical inductivism. To modern American philosophers the major emphasis in this Congress upon speculation would sound like a voice from the tomb. We define philosophy in terms of conclusions drawn from ascertained and proved facts and not in terms of conclusions derived deductively from traditionally sanctioned beliefs, either sacred or profane. (2073)

M. M. T.

LATE ARRIVALS

SCIENCE AND COMMON SENSE. By *James B. Conant*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951. pp. xii-371. \$4.00.

President Conant has written a book of great significance to the layman who has been puzzled by the contradictory reports coming from the regions of science. Since 1900 we have been recovering from the scientific dogmatism that has held us in thrall by means of a "scientific revolution of the first importance." His aim has been to set before the man of the street some account

of these perturbations and to show both the limitations and the means of experimentation by which we are arriving at increasing knowledge.

While the book is intended primarily for the general reader, it will benefit those diehard scientists who steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the new light that is shining in the scientific darkness. Such a case was recently reported in the daily press of two scientists of this kind who believe in nothing but matter but are glad to overlook the experiments that have been made to disprove a substantial ether and to base a proof on a highly conjectural gap which they think they have discovered in Einstein's equations. This resort to conceptual "proof" by materialists approaches the dimensions of humor.

Everywhere in his discussion President Conant shows himself forthright and balanced, free from dogmatism, and open to conviction. He has produced a work on science of special importance to the average reader.

It may seem ungracious to add criticism to a book so generally correct, but surely President Conant did not mean to make so unqualified a statement as occurs on page 11: "A Latin translation of the Greek would not have come into the hands of a man of Galileo's bent and genius three hundred years earlier, for the first Latin translation of Archimedes was made by William of Moerbeke and was printed in 1543." Has he forgotten the letter of Cassiodorus (fl. 5th and 6th Cent.) to Boethius complimenting the latter for "having given back the mechanician Archimedes in Latin to the Sicilians"? R. T. F.

WORDS AND THEIR USE. By *Stephen Ullman*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. 108. \$2.75.

This is a useful little volume for anyone who wishes a brief and clear introduction to the general study of the nature, functions, and evils of words. A lot of ground is covered in approximately a hundred pages, within the limits of which the author deals in four parts with language and meaning, meaning and ambiguity, the vocabulary in motion, and words and things. Unfortunately, as is the vogue at present, semantics is identified dogmatically with nominalism and empiricism; and as a consequence the most pressing problems in the field of meaning and symbolism are escaped, and the reader easily falls into what might be called either a radical subjective, sensualistic idealism, on the one hand, or materialism, on the other. The author, also following a current tradition, fails to point out that the semantic problem is as old as Plato, at least, and was discussed by a long line of medieval and modern thinkers, noteworthy among whom were the British antecedents of Bentham and his offspring, Ogden and Richards. One intimately related field not yet explored systematically is that of "words and their abuse." This volume is carefully written. Perhaps it would be one that could properly be put out in paper cover at some saving to the buyer. W. L.

A CYCLE OF CATHAY. By *William W. Appleton*. Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1951. pp. xii-182. \$3.00.

Appleton's *A Cycle of Cathay* describes that strange enthusiasm for things

Chinese that seized upon portions of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This movement scarcely gained in England the importance it did in France but wherever it arose it influenced literature, economic and political theory, and religion. The Chinese trend got its inception from the Jesuit missionaries who went out to a China, presumed far inferior to the West in culture, only to be surprised at the arts and sciences displayed there, but even more so at the orderliness of their government, the far-sightedness of their political and economic theory, and the moral qualities of their religion.

Chinese art led to English Chippendale, and asymmetrical gardens loaded with tea-pergolas, to say nothing of establishing tea drinking as the leading English pastime. Their doctrine of the Emperor as father of his people, absolute, but who could be deposed if proven detrimental to the common good, may have had something to do with the beheading of Charles. Their political theories had much more influence in France but did influence the ideas of Adam Smith. The Chinese chronology, through the doctrine of the pre-Adamites, forced the way to Biblical Higher Criticism and gave comfort to the English deists and the "mummified Chinese way of life gratified solid Tories and cautious Whigs" (41)

The work is well written, exceedingly interesting, and calls attention to a little-understood period of European history. R. T. F.

ARAB SEAFARING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN ANCIENT AND EARLY MEDIEVAL TIMES.

By *George Fadlo Hourani*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951. pp. xi-131. \$3.00.

There has been much discussion of the great trade routes that joined East and West before the dawn of historic interests in the western world. We have wondered at the tale of King Solomon's mines, at the legends of seafaring connected with Sumerian, Chaldean, and Babylonian history. The land routes from China have been marked out, at least some of the ancient sites of trade along those routes have been dug up, but little attention has been paid to the most eligible means of communication of them all. In *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean* we have the answers to these questions, light which illuminates many dark corners that eluded explanation in history. No one interested in those problems of interchanges between East and West can afford to miss the information put here so briefly and intelligently. R. T. F.

KAHLIL GIBRAN, A BIOGRAPHY. By *Mikhail Naimy*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1950. pp. xviii-265. \$3.75.

In reading this book one asks again and again which is the greater of the two, the biographer or the biographee? Naimy has done more than write a book about his friend Kahlil Gibran whom some inveterate enthusiasts would rank among the immortals. He has pried into the inmost recesses of the poet-artist yet has tempered adulation with psychoanalytical candor. Indeed, the "Prophet" emerges as a man with all his failings together with his strong points which

carried him above the crowd. It leaves him an oversensitive spirit, a man who aspired to Nietzschean heights but drifted back to lyricism by force of habit. A thunderous prophet does not, cannot, sketch so delicately, almost effeminately, as did Gibran.

Gibran did not truly mirror the East as some are wont to believe. He stood at the crossroads of East and West. It is easy to vilify Boston and New York, but the wind sweeps as cleanly through these cities as through the cedars of Lebanon provided you seek the elevation or the park. Let us not forget that the Arrabita and the renaissance of literature for which it stood, was not born in the hookah dens of Beirut, but in some modest quarter of New York City. Also let no one forget that the guardian angel of Gibran was neither Lebanese nor a lover lost in the abyss of his petrel soul; it was an American lady, the depth of whose soul neither Gibran nor Naimy was capable of comprehending. The grinding poverty of which we hear so much and to which the Lebanese immigrant Gibran was subjected in the "slums" of Boston and New York, was no worse than a discipline in which the genius peculiar to him was incubated. In luxury it would have surely jaded. As it was, his net estate when he died came to over fifty thousand dollars, and that after the great depression. Not too bad for an immigrant in his forties who even late in his thirties, and before the publication of his best seller, *The Prophet*, would not disdain to speculate in the real estate market. "Materialistic as these contributions of America may have been, they were, nonetheless, contributions to the Orient where Gibran now lies in his tomb.

The book is not entirely biography. It contains as much or more of the philosophy of Naimy as it does of Gibran's and most of it is good and sound, agreeing as it does for the most part with the best in Oriental wisdom. The charm to the casual and sentimental reader lies in the fact that it is put forth as a new discovery in the alembic of these poets who were exposed to some of the best in western and eastern culture.

K. F. L.

ROYCE'S LOGICAL ESSAYS. Edited by *Daniel S. Robinson*. Wm. C. Brown Co., Dubuque, 1951. pp. xvi-447. \$5.00.

Professor Robinson has earned the gratitude of many students of philosophy for his *An Anthology of Modern Philosophy*, *An Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, and other similar works. It is fitting that his latest volume should continue this signal service of making available in convenient form certain important philosophical essays. The editor of this historically interesting collection, himself a student in Royce's last class in Advanced Logic, hopes

. . . that the publication of this collection of his logical essays may promote a revival of interest in the thinking of the ablest of all American logicians. . . . For Royce was a philosophic genius whom every real thinker must at least respect, and one whom no student can afford to neglect . . . [and again] no competent authority will question his right to be ranked as one of America's foremost logicians. (xi-xiii)

Students and scholars of idealism will find these essays especially interesting, for these are useful antidotes to premature "hardening of the categories" respecting the question of whether there are or are not multiple legitimate logical theories. Surely the idealistic logic must be granted first place as being our oldest logic. Royce's systematic attempts to formulate a wedding of his logic and metaphysics deserve our admiration. We cannot fail to admire the perseverance with which he set his task, and the rigor and clarity he displayed in the process. These essays are, indeed, an object lesson in the fact that idealists number in their midst some first-class logicians. The publication of these essays in one volume serves one purpose especially well: it enables us to witness and evaluate Royce-the-logician and minimizes the possibility of confusing him with Royce-the-metaphysician.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains essays on "Non-Symbolic Logic and Methodology." For example, "Error and Truth," "Axiom," "Order," to mention only three of fourteen similar works. The most interesting, to the reviewer's mind, are the chapters on "Order," and "Introduction to Poincaré's Foundations of Science." Part II contains three detailed technical analyses in "Symbolic Logic," "An Extension of the Algebra of Logic," "The Principles of Logic," and "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry." The last-named essay Royce "... considered ... his most important single contribution to logic." (xii)

The book has a limited use. This would be expected for the original works, without exception, occurred in journals, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and books which themselves were directed toward the specialist. This probably accounts for the high price of the volume which, nevertheless, should find its proper place in philosophy, science, and mathematics libraries. ALLAN E. SHIELDS
San Diego State College

THE WAY TO GOD. By *Maxwell Silver*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1950. pp. x-303. \$3.00.

This is an unusual book. It is the exposition of the essential meaning of life as found in the Hebrew prophets, especially illustrated by Jeremiah, wherein a distinguished rabbi challenges the modern skepticism of our day in its philosophical sophistication. This he evidently feels stems in large measure from Aristotle. The six chapters and prologue and epilogue take the form of conversations with the author's son, Harold, who, one gathers, is a well-educated sincere seeker for truth who questions, nevertheless, the validity of the answers made by the Jewish faith to the problems of living.

The situation is alive in that Harold is about to set forth into World War II. The problem is: "How, in decent reason, [can religious faith] reconcile its Gospel of Hope in our World? Even though prompted by the laudable motive of saving his traditional faith, does not one lay himself open to the charge of intellectual obtuseness when he attempts philosophically to explain away the existence of real—and faith-shattering—evil in the world?"

Throughout much of the book the author maintains an atmosphere of the genuine interplay of minds, each respectful of the other but each independent in approach to pressing philosophical problems. At points, the device of dialogue bogs down in long extended discourses indicating a wider aim of the author than the reporting of actual conversations of a superior quality. In fact, in the omission of quotation marks throughout, the reader readily grasps the universalizing intent of the book. Frankly, both by title and by contents, the book must be adjudged an apologetic for Judaism. This is a psychological handicap, yet an unbiased mind must concede that at many points the author shows the superiority of a living faith over pure rationalistic philosophy. In fact, his own treatment of the problems of living proves that Judaism is philosophic in its handling of life, even if it is not driven by the necessity of being thoroughly systematic in its rational conclusions.

The book discusses with admirable objectivity and reserve the "dark side of religion" in its frequent worldly preoccupation with preserving an institution at the expense of meeting human need. It wrestles with the relationship of reason to mysticism, of faith to logic, of ethical challenge to world chaos, of suffering and frustration to significance. In the end, faith as epitomized by the prophets emerges triumphant, the author remarking: "Fundamentally, all great religions are ultimately based on the element of faith in the ultimate beneficence of our universe." This being true, "it is but natural that there should inevitably lurk on the periphery . . . of everyman's faith, the element of intellectual doubt . . . The significant difference, however, between the position of . . . any . . . deeply religious soul, who has not, and the individual who has, allowed himself to succumb to the 'sceptic' within him is that the former has, what the latter has not: *Someone to meaningfully address that disturbing query to!*" The author quotes his father as having said: "We who believe in the existence of God have at least the comfort of having Somebody to complain to for our misfortunes, but those who argue: 'There is neither Justice nor Judge in the world'—these poor fools haven't even Someone to complain to!" Harold's response in the end is the recognition "that a deep-lying abiding faith is neither a matter of any easy acceptance of tradition, nor the prize of a conveniently arrived-at syllogism, but is rather an arduous, often lifelong, spiritual-moral achievement."

In the epilogue, an excerpt from the son's letter from the foxholes of the Pacific Islands, the boy writes that in the face of war and death: "the 'still, small voice' has enabled me on occasion to look beyond all this desolation. . . . It has helped me to direct my thoughts to that grand heroism of so many of our men, who performed their duty, as they saw it, unafraid of death! As though death did not matter, but duty did! As though duty was informed with a mystic destiny that swallows up death!" Thus he says, it does help, "in the very teeth of personal tragedy, to capture a precious bit of their [the Prophets'] indefeasible confidence in existence and of that deep, deathless serenity which was theirs as a result of this mystic trust."

The book is beautifully printed, and one who reads it will come away

thoughtful as well as convinced of the reality that has come to us all through the Jewish faith. W. W. F.

MAN AND MORALS. By *Celestine N. Bittle*. Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1950. pp. v-703. \$4.00.

If a book carries the *imprimatur*, it is impossible for it to treat of its subject in any other way than on the basis of standard assumptions and pre-established conclusions. What we can expect is merely a novel treatment. As a textbook in ethics for undergraduates wishing to be grounded in their Catholic faith and doctrine, *Man and Morals* seems excellent, but it will have no or very little appeal to the teacher of ethics who is not within this tradition. By virtue of its dogmatic character it is more than a textbook: it is a handbook of Catholic morality. For instance, by working the diagram on page 44, anyone may schematically determine the moral rightness or wrongness of an action. A good deal of comfort can thus be derived in situations where the Protestant and liberal flounder and enmesh their souls per chance in eternal torments. The oversimplification of the schematism is apparent throughout, of which a consideration like this one: "... if the flyer was fighting a just war," is typical, an appearance of thoroughness of analysis notwithstanding. Such concepts as the permissibility of an action under certain conditions introduce a great deal of latitude even into this rigid system which might become fatal to its understructure. By the way, "war, under certain conditions, is *justified by natural law*." The illustrations or cases are, for the most part, drawn from modern life and the last, in particular, was.

The non-Catholic, by all means, should familiarize himself with the Catholic viewpoint in ethics and Bittle offers a convenient opportunity in this respect. He will see how in actual practice the double standard of human reason and faith work out in a concrete situation. He will be amazed at the categorizing tendency which unerring certainty assigns each action a definite moral status. When still in doubt, there is the authority of the church to smooth out the last ripples of conscience which is, anyway, "the immediate judgment of practical reason." It might be asked, what is the good of reason, practical or otherwise, if its decisions can be nullified by a higher authority?

There is much terminology in this book which is scholastic and is not to be found in any other western text on ethics. Sometimes it has the appearance as if the author were caught up to such an extent in scholastic and Aristotelian concepts that he shuts out the possibility of reinterpreting ethical reality and theory in the light of modern research. The concept of "family" is one such when used as a blanket term to cover human association on most primitive, as well as highly developed, levels.

The point of view of Catholic authority with respect to the separation of church and state or education and similar issues is, of course, well known. Heartening is the determined stand against communism, distressing is the fact that unification of the Christian churches is held to be a moral impossibility. (587) The summaries at the end of the chapter are exemplarily executed

and the glossary is most helpful although it could have been made fuller. For clarity of exposition and sharpness of delineation of concepts, a text based on rational principles and authority is unequaled, but it stifles the imagination and leaves nothing to exploration or the discovery of new values in this life ever more replete with moral issues.

K. F. L.

THE LEGACY OF MAIMONIDES. By *Ben Zion Bokser*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1950. pp. ix-128. \$3.75.

A book of interpretation of this acknowledged great thinker of Judaism is especially welcome in view of the publication, now in process, by Yale University Press, of *The Code of Maimonides* in translation. Thus made available to the general reading public, the work of Maimonides is bound to generate an interest in his life and significance. For this task Dr. Bokser, who is a lecturer in theology at the Jewish Theological Seminary of New York, manifests ample ability.

The book devotes a chapter each to the following topics: I. Moses Maimonides, His Life and Work. II. Reason and the Quest for Truth. III. How Shall We Think of God? IV. Religion in Culture. V. Man as a Citizen of the Universe. VI. The Legacy of Maimonides. His great work is affirmed to be his *Guide to the Perplexed* in which he endeavored to come to grips with Aristotelian thought in order to prepare perplexed, thinking Jews to make adjustment to the enthronement of reason without the loss of religious faith. He recognized the role of reason in life but felt that there were "certain questions [which] will always elude us." In such matters recourse can only be had to revelation. "In matters of a speculative nature, everyone acts according to the results of his own study and accepts that which appears to him established by proof." (63) But he felt that the "Torah embodies all the truth, speculative as well as practical, which mankind needs to attain the highest goals of human life. . . . Its goal and scope are universal . . . By contemplating the world about him, he [Abraham] came to the vision of one universal God as the source of all the creative energies in the universe." (64-65) "It thus became the function of the Jewish people to implement the vision projected by Abraham . . . [and thus] the Jews were under a constant mandate to 'invite all mankind to His worship and to faith in Him.'"

Those who read this book will find it a fair and stimulating interpretation of the contribution of Maimonides, although perhaps many will feel as dissatisfied with the bifurcation of life into the realms of reason and revelation as this reviewer is. We would agree with the author that "the issue which challenges contemporary religion is not science as such, but the generalizations which some men draw from it." (107) But the secularism which results, and which the author and this writer both decry, is the product of the dichotomy which Maimonides (and many another since his time) asserts. It rises perhaps from an inexact understanding of reason and its function. For surely revelation cannot take place but in and through mental functioning and it cannot "make sense" until it is related in an orderly way to experience. The

author seems partially to realize this when he says: "Let reason unite her strength with that of the truth which comes from revelation and as loyal allies let them both labor for the enlightenment of man. Then will man rise to his noblest destiny." (109) This "is the principal legacy which his writings have to offer to posterity. When men will seek a view of the universe which will not rob life of its dignity or its hope, they will walk in the footsteps of Moses Maimonides." (110) This one may readily grant without feeling that the way in which this may be accomplished has been made really clear either in this book or in its exposition of the work of Maimonides.

W. W. F.

THE LANGUAGE BAR. By *Victor Grove*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1950. pp. vi-160. \$3.75.

The author, an Englishman, grounds his argument on the premise that it is much harder for an English-speaking child to learn English than it is for a French child, say, to learn French or a German child to learn German. It is harder partly because of the irrational spelling but mainly because of the multilingual vocabulary. Self-explaining compounds, such as *windmill*, which are the rule in most languages, are rare in English, so that *tripod* is Greek to us whereas *Dreifuss* is German to the German.

The effect is to raise a language bar between the minority well enough educated to know their language and the rest of the populace, the low-brows who, in thus being deprived of their national language, are barred from any effective share in the democratic process and barred from the spiritual heritage of their national literature—the only spiritual heritage they have in this secular age. We can see around us every day the effects of the language bar.

The author's remedy is not one that dodges the difficulties. He does not propose to reform the language—either by casting out the foreign elements or by simplifying the vocabulary as in *Basic* or as in *Flesch's* skirmish against suffixes. These methods would forever put behind the language bar the literature which it is Mr. Grove's aim to save. His method is to teach the formative elements of our foreign vocabulary, the roots and affixes—to begin early and do it so well that the child "can see the horses in *cavalry*."

The author puts the case for this kind of language study very well. But what he ought to have done, and will yet have to do to make his case, is to provide such a good course of study that the schools can't pass it up. It will have to be good, because he has against him not only the prevailing educational theories but possibly something in the nature of the English language itself. It seems to me that the genius of the language, as shown by its dropping of most inflections and word-forming affixes, is to treat the word as an unanalyzed unit. So that *tripod* will have to continue to stand on its own legs, so to speak, and forego its kinship to *podium* and such Latin cousins as *biped* and *pedestal*.

FRANCIS CHRISTENSEN

AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PSYCHOLOGY. By O. L. Zangwill. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1950. pp. xi-227. \$3.75.

The author makes no apologies for his belief that the future growth of psychology will be due to new findings in the realm of the physiological aspects of psychology. This is understandable in that the author deals with modern psychology from the biological point of view. Furthermore only those aspects of modern psychology which can be studied by the methods of empirical science are dealt with in this book. In the discussion on the background of modern psychology the author emphasizes primarily those persons who have made contributions from the experimental or physiological point of view. The survey of experimental psychology places primary emphasis on the classic areas of experimentation, such as: sensory adaptation, perception, cortical sensory areas, phi phenomena, conditioned learning, trial-and-error, and some experiments on the acquisition and breakdown of human skills.

In the section of physiological psychology special attention is given the evolutionary development of the higher cortical levels of human brain function. This evolutionary development of the forebrain is shown to be closely related to the higher and more complex forms of human learning. Experiments are cited which demonstrate the method and findings of experimental studies on animal and human cortical functioning. In connection with this section an approach to human emotional reaction from the standpoint of evolutionary neurology is attempted.

The problem of mental measurement is superficially covered in a short chapter. The point of view expressed does not reflect the present-day approach of mental testing and consequently this chapter may lead to misconceptions in a field which has developed tremendously in the last ten years.

A brief and somewhat biased evaluation of psychoanalysis as a theory of personality, and as a theory of the neurosis is made. No reference is made to more recent neo-Freudian emphasis or the points of view of other present-day non-Freudians. Work done by Sheldon, and others, on the relationship between physique and personality does not appeal to the author.

From the point of view of the author, "The primary aim of psychological science is to understand human nature: Its secondary aim is to serve society." (216)

This pocket-sized book has between its covers much psychological information. Because it does not make an attempt to make a comprehensive study of even those areas to which he gives primary attention it is difficult to know who will benefit most by the book. For the layman the book is too biased in the direction of physiological and experimental psychology. For the psychology student or psychologist this book will make available a review of many studies in the areas indicated. This book's compactness and outline coverage will appeal to students of physiological and experimental psychology.

L. V. W.

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